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An early twentieth-century fable tells the story of a man who
climbed to the top of a high mountain, stood on his tiptoes and grabbed
hold of the Truth.I After an alarmed demon notified him, Satan is said to
have responded by "institutionalizing" the Truth, an event that has had
2
quite an influence on the various religious traditions in America. When
a religious organization incorporates under a state law, it adopts a secular
corporate form, and, by taking on a corporate form, a quintessential
institutional characteristic, it has "institutionalized" its Truth.3
Corporate form is at the core of Supreme Court developed
Religion Clause jurisprudence when considering internal disputes of
* Visiting Assistant Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America,
Columbus School of Law. Prior to joining the faculty of Catholic University's law
school as Distinguished Practitioner in Residence in the fall of 2012, Professor
Jackson was in private practice. During the last ten years in private practice he was
extensively involved in church litigation.
1. See HUSTON SMITH, THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS: OUR GREAT WISDOM
TRADITIONS 5 (1991).
2. Id.
3. See WILLIAM W. BASSETT ET AL., RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS AND THE LAW
xxiii (2011) ("There are more than one thousand religious denominations in the
United States . . . [that] employ or use the services of hundreds of thousands of
people and manage and control billions of dollars in assets.") (citing the U.S. Dep't
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 67
(113th ed. 1993)); see also PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGION
LANDSCAPE SURVEY: SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 5 (2008) (reporting that 78.4% of
Americans are Christian. Out of the Christian grouping, 51.3% are Protestants,
23.9% are Catholics, 1.7% are Mormons, 0.7% Jehovah's Witnesses, and 0.9%
making up Orthodox (Greek, Russian and Other), and Other Christian).
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religious corporations. A normative First Amendment Religion Clause
doctrinal analysis of an internal dispute within a religious corporation
emphasizes internal organizational structure and corporate form.4 This
emphasis leads to a bifurcated consideration of the dispute. The
bifurcation, however, is a function of the religious corporation's internal
organizational structure which is either hierarchical or congregational. A
hierarchically structured religious organization is governed by an
ecclesiastical tribunal that exercises authority over the membership.'
Mainline Christian Protestant religious organizations (e.g., Anglicans,
6
Presbyterians, and Methodists), and Catholics are hierarchically
structured and so governed.' This is in contrast to non-Mainline
Christian groups like Baptists and Quakers, and non-Christian groups
like Jews, Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists, whose internal
organizational structures are congregational, where the internal affairs of
4. See Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1871).
5. In religious organizations governed by an ecclesiastical tribunal, the tribunal
holds "general and ultimate power of control . . . over the whole membership of' its
subordinate member organizations. Id. at 722-23.
6. In this Article, I rely on the Pew Forum on Religion & Public Life's U.S.
Religion Landscape Survey (2008) description of Mainline Christian Protestant:
Baptist, Methodist, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Anglican/Episcopal, Restorationist (e.g.
Disciples of Christ), Congregationalist (e.g., United Church of Christ), Reformed
(e.g., Reformed Church of America), Anabaptist, and Friends. According to the
survey, of the 78.4% Christians in the United States, 18.1% are Mainline Protestants.
See PEW FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, supra note 3, at 5, 10, 12. Of this
18.1%, 5.4% are Methodist, 2.8% are Lutheran, 1.9% are Presbyterian, and 1.4% are
Anglican/Episcopal. Id.
7. BASSETT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3:7 nn.9-10, at 3-28 ("The major
hierarchical churches in America are the Roman Catholic Church, the various
Eastern Orthodox Churches, the Episcopal Church [Anglican], the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), and some Lutheran (Missouri Synod) and
Brethren churches." "Churches using a connectional [presbyterial] polity include the
Presbyterian Church (USA), the Reformed Church in America, the Evangelical and
Reformed Church, the Christian Reformed Church, and other Calvinist and some
Lutheran churches."). See also id. at n.1 I ("The United Methodist Church and the
Church of the United Brethren in Christ use a hybrid form of presbyterial and
episcopal polity, but because ultimate authority is placed above the local
congregation, they are generally considered hierarchical.").
8. See, e.g., BASSETT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3:7 n.8, at 3-28 (providing
examples of religious organizations adhering to the non-hierarchical congregational
model of polity: "United Church of Christ, Unitarian Universalists, Disciples of
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each organization are governed exclusively by its members
independently from any other religious tribunal or institution.9
The significance of the hierarchical-congregational distinction
was emphasized for the first time in the wake of the Civil War in Watson
v. Jones. 0 The distinction continues today as a vibrant centerpiece of
Religion Clause doctrine applicable to a religious corporation's internal
property disputes.' As a substantive part of the doctrine, it shapes
analysis. It does so by the effect it has on the doctrinal options available
to civil courts when considering internal organizational disputes.
A civil court has two options when considering a religious
organization's internal dispute. It may either defer to the decision made
by the religious corporation's internal governing body on the matter, or,
provided the dispute does not involve ecclesiastical issues, it may engage
and resolve the matter by applying neutral principles of law.12 To
understand how the hierarchical-congregational distinction affects the
analysis, consider its application to a hierarchical religious corporation.
In a hierarchically organized and governed religious corporation, a
normative analysis considering an internal property dispute offers a court
the option to either defer to the decision of the organization's highest
religious tribunal on matters of religious discipline, faith, governance,
custom or doctrine, 3 or, if the matter does not involve these issues, it
may choose to resolve the matter by the application of "neutral principles
of law." The "neutral principles of law" approach allows civil courts to
Christ, Baptists, The Society of Friends [Quakers], Churches of Christ, some
Adventist and Lutheran churches, as well as most Jewish congregations.").
9. See Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at
Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (per curiam); see also Watson, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) at 722 ("[W]hen the property is held by a religious congregation which, by
the nature of its organization, is strictly independent of other ecclesiastical
associations, and so far as the church government is concerned, owes no fealty or
obligation to any higher authority.").
10. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 722, 724-27.
11. See e.g. Erdman v. Chapel Hill Presbyterian Church, 286 P.3d 357, 369-70
(Wash. 2012) (finding that because of hierarchical structure of defendant
Presbyterian church, its decisions were entitled to deference from the civil court).
12. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-03 (1979); Md. & Va. Eldership, 396
U.S. at 368-69 (Brennan, J., concurring) (per curiam).
13. Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602; Serb. E.. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426
U.S. 696, 709 (1976); Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727. See also Md & Va.
Eldership, 396 U.S. at 368-69 (Brennan, J., concurring) (per curiam).
92
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fact find by consulting a corporation's secular documents such as deeds,
charters, and organizational bylaws, as well as state statutes and
constitutions,14 and then apply well-known legal rules to settle the
matter. Similarly, for congregationally organized and governed
religious corporations, a court has the option to either defer to the
decision of a majority of the members of the congregation on
ecclesiastical matters, or, decide the matter by the application of "neutral
principles of law."' 6 Ironically, this normative analysis that is designed
to keep a court from unwarranted involvement in a religious
organization's ecclesiastical affairs (those involving faith, doctrine,
governance, polity," administration, or the organization's right to
choose who will carry out its ecclesiastical and spiritual functions' 9 )
often leads to a contrary result for congregational organizations.20 Given
14. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 603; Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S. at 370 (Brennan,
J., concurring) (per curiam).
15. Wolf 443 U.S. at 603.
16. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727; Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S. at 368-
69 (Brennan, J., concurring) (per curiam). A court may decide to ignore the
organizational distinctions and principles of deference and instead apply, "neutral
principles of law," provided, that is, in the application of "neutral principles", there
is no reliance on ecclesiastical matters. See Wolf, 443 U.S. at 602 ("[A] State may
adopt any one of various approaches for settling church property disputes so long as
it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters . . . .. (quoting Md. & Va.
Eldership, 396 U.S. at 368) (Brennan, J., concurring) (per curiam) (emphasis in
original)); see also id. at 604 ("In undertaking such an examination [using 'neutral
principles' to examine a religious organization's non-secular documents], a civil
court must take special care to ... not ... rely on religious precepts . . . .").
17. Cf Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russ. Orthodox Church, 344 U.S.
94, 117 (1952) ("The Court of Appeals of New York recognized, generally, the
soundness of the philosophy of ecclesiastical control of church administration and
polity but concluded that the exercise of that control was not free from legislative
interference.").
18. See, e.g., Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 710 ("'[T]he [First]
Amendment therefore commands civil courts to decide church property disputes
without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine.' This principle
applies with equal force to church disputes over church polity and church
administration." (quoting Presbyterian Church v. Hull Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449
(1969)).
19. See EEOC v. Catholic Univ. of Am., 83 F.3d 455, 460-62 (D.C. Cir.
1996); McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972).
20. Compare Tomic v. Catholic Diocese of Peoria, 442 F.3d 1036 (7th Cir.
2006) (noting that the Catholic Church is hierarchically organized and governed and
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the option of either deferring to the religious corporation's institutional
internal governing body to avoid the risk of becoming entangled in
prohibited ecclesiastical affairs, or, tangling with the matter by
application of "neutral principles of law," all too often an organization of
congregational polity 21 will find itself less likely to benefit from a court's
deference and more likely to be subject to the more intrusive "neutral
principles of law."
One of the primary reasons for this is that civil courts frequently
fail to recognize or acknowledge the ecclesiastical nature of internal
disputes within congregational polities in the same way they do for those
with a hierarchical polity.22 All too often, civil courts presume the
controversy within religious corporations of hierarchical polity involves
ecclesiastical doctrine while considering like issues within
congregational polities to be corporate contractual matters subject to a
4 23"neutral principles of law" approach. The most significant contributing
refusing to intervene in the termination of church organist on grounds that the matter
involved an internal church affair which courts are prohibited from engaging), with
Vann v. Guildfield Missionary Baptist Church, 452 F. Supp. 2d 651 (W.D. Va.
2006) (noting that the Baptist Church is congregationally organized and governed
and allowing claim of Baptist minister that he had been wrongfully terminated by
Chairman of the Deacon Board). See also Ira Mark Ellman, Driven from the
Tribunal: Judicial Resolution of Internal Church Disputes, 69 CAL. L. REV. 1378,
1406 (1981) ("Matters of governance in hierarchical churches . . . are ecclesiastical
in nature and not to be examined by courts. The decisions of congregational
churches against analogous claims can be reviewed, however. Why matters of
governance are ecclesiastical in hierarchical churches but not in congregational
churches remains unexplained. It would doubtless puzzle adherents of those
congregational Protestant denominations that see their governance arrangements as a
theologically critical distinction separating them from churches adopting less
democratic structures.").
21. Brady v. Reiner, 198 S.E.2d 812, 827 n.3 (W. Va. 1973) ("Polity refers to
the general governmental structure of a church, the organs of authority and the
allocation and locus of its judicatory powers as defined by its own organic law.");
BASSETT ET AL., supra note 3, §3:6, at 3-21 ("The internal organizational framework
of religious organizations, their pattems of association, cooperation, and governance,
the structures by which they implement their doctrine and live their religious
commitment, are called church polity.").
22. See supra note 20.
23. Compare Dowd v. Soc'y of St. Columbans, 861 F.2d 761, 764 (1st Cir.
1988) (recognizing a Catholic (hierarchically organized and governed) priest's
previous breach of contract claim against his religious order, the Society, as
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factor to this aberration is the corporate form of the congregational
24
religious organization. While most religious organizations are
organized under one form or another of a state's incorporation statute,
the form most common to the congregational religious organization is
that of a not-for-profit corporation.25 As a creature of a state's not-for-
profit incorporation statute, the organization is required to follow the
statute's operational requirements by adopting bylaws for the governance
of its affairs, passing resolutions to authorize its corporate acts, and
26
documenting corporate decisions with minutes. Many bind their clergy
by contract.27 This blend of corporate process and procedure with
religious practice has a tendency to turn religious tradition and doctrine
28
into mere circumstance. When this happens, civil courts are often
seduced by the corporate side of the congregational corporation, and
internal disputes of the type that are normally handled by hierarchical
tribunals are, in the case of congregational polities, handled by a civil
court judge as a corporate matter.29 When a court decides to take the
road most familiar and follow its corporate instincts, religious freedoms
are often put in peril; rules are followed, but injustice is done.30
involving "rules, policies and decisions which should be left to the exclusive
religious jurisdiction of the church and the Society"), with Ervin v. Lilydale
Progressive Missionary Baptist Church, 813 N.E.2d 1073 (111. App. Ct. 2004)
(applying "neutral legal principles" in deciding that trial court could exercise
jurisdiction over Baptist (congregationally organized and governed) pastor's claim
that his termination was not in keeping with church's bylaw procedures).
24. See infra Part V.
25. See infra Part 1.
26. See infra Part I.
27. See infra Part 1
28. See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION 40-41 (James H.
Tully ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1983). Locke explains this concept by using the
example that, whereas the Jewish Sabbath on Saturday is rooted in worship, for
Christians, it is a circumstance. Id. at 41.
29. See infra Part V.
30. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS & MASKS OF THE LAw 6 (1976) ("It is no
accident that in those trials which have been celebrated in literature and in the
history of our consciousness-the trial of Socrates, the trial of Thomas More, the
trial of Jesus-the rules were followed and yet the human judgment has always been
that injustice was done, the person condemned to death was not given his due, the
paradigm of justice was violated.").
95
This Article considers how corporate form and internal
organizational structure affect a normative First Amendment Religion
Clause analysis of a dispute within a religious corporation. It considers
how the Janus-like face of a religious corporation, pious on one side and
corporate on the other, often clouds the analysis when a court is seduced
into focusing more on the organization's corporate side rather than its
religious side. Part I of this Article highlights the significant role of a
religious organization's corporate form by identifying and describing the
predominant corporate forms used by most of the religious organizations
in the United States. Part II describes the origin of the First
Amendment's Religion Clauses. Part III unpacks and describes Religion
Clause doctrine as it has evolved out of the common law between 1871
and 1940. Part IV describes the doctrine's subsequent evolution
pursuant to constitutional principles. Part V argues that, because most
religious organizations of congregational polity are not-for-profit
corporations with a secular corporate form and organizational structure,
they are seen and treated more like secular corporations than like
religious organizations. The Article concludes that the more
constitutionally sound First Amendment Religion Clause doctrinal
analysis should focus on whether the essence of the controversy is
ecclesiastical, rather than on corporate form.
PART I. THE VARIETIES OF RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONAL CORPORATE
FORM
Corporations have figured prominently in the evolution of
religion in America. As early as 1606, at a time when England was still
an "emerging market,"3' the Virginia Company, organized as a joint
31. The term "emerging market" was coined during the 1980s by World Bank
economist Antoine van Agtmael. See NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY: A
FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE WORLD 288 (2009); see also Chuan Li, What Are
Emerging Markets?, UNIV. OF IOWA CENTER FOR INT'L FIN. & DEV.,
http://blogs.law.uiowa.edulebook/faqs/what-are-emerging-markets (last visited Feb.
24, 2012) ("Emerging markets are countries that are restructuring their economies
along market-oriented lines and offer a wealth of opportunities in trade, technology
transfers, and foreign direct investment.").
FIRST AMENDMENT LA W RE VIE W96 [Vol. 11I
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stock company by English merchants32 to capitalize on what they were
calculating would be a profitable economy in the New World,33 was
headed for a destiny with William Bradford and the Mayflower Pilgrims.
Jamestown, Virginia became the Virginia Company's flagship
for creation of a new market economy and economic development in
North America.34 By 1620, though, the Company was nearly bankrupt,
having lost over E200,000 and nearly three-quarters of its immigrants.
Desperately seeking ways to salvage its investment, the Company was
more than receptive to inquiries by a band of Dutch Puritans who wanted
to leave Holland and resettle in the New World. Subsequently, those
whom we now embrace as the "Pilgrim Fathers" set sail on the
Mayflower37 to settle within a land grant belonging to the Virginia
Company in Jamestown.38 Two months later they landed instead, by
accident, far north of their Virginia destination within a sparsely
populated land grant of the Council for New England, known today as
Plymouth, Massachusetts.39
40
Over the next decade, the Plymouth colony stagnated. But,
another corporate venture changed all of that with the 1630 arrival of
John Winthrop in Salem, Massachusetts, as the advance party of
"England's largest colonial migration."4 1 As head of a newly created
32. SYDNEY E. AHLSTROM, A RELIGIOUS HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
104-05 (2d ed. 2004) (stating that the arrival at the mouth of the James River on
May 2, 1607 of three ships was "an effort by a group of London and Plymouth
merchants to establish a trading outpost in the New World. Having organized a joint-
stock company, they obtained in 1606 a charter which designated two tracts of land
along the Virginia coast . . . for colonization.").
33. See id.
34. Id.
35. Id. at 105 ("The cost of the experiment was high. The company lost over
£200,000 in the enterprise, and finally collapsed in bankruptcy . . . . By 1618 the
population had grown to about 1,000, yet in 1623, despite the immigration of 4,000
more, the population still numbered only 1,200. Ravaged by Indian massacres,
pestilence, misgovernment, sloth, avarice, disorderliness, and neglect, the Jamestown
settlement all but expired.").
36. See id. at 137.
37. Id. at 137-38.
38. Id. at 105.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 105-06.
41. Id. at 144, 146-47.
97
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corporate entity, the Massachusetts Bay Company, formed by a group of
42
wealthy Puritans in Dorchester, England, Winthrop's ship, the Arbella,
was the first of eleven Bay Company ships that would arrive within the
43
year. It was on the deck of the Arbella that Winthrop, armed with a
new corporate charter, coined the now famous "city on a hill"
metaphor.4 He was expressing a sentiment at the core of the Puritan
ethos: that God was in a covenant relationship with the people of
England that made them His "chosen people" and the New World was
their promised land, a "city on a hill. "4 Robert Bellah points out that in
Roger Williams' view, the "hill" Winthrop was making reference to
"was somebody else's hill!"4 6
Empirical evidence suggests that today Winthrop's "hill" is a
dynamic and religiously plural landscape, populated by religious
traditions diversified and subdivided along denominational lines47 and
made up of thousands of independent churches, temples, and mosques,
most organized and incorporated as either a not-for-profit corporation or
42. Id. at 106.
43. See id. at 144, 147.
44. See Jeffrey A. Brauch, John Winthrop: Lawyer As Model of Christian
Charity, 11 REGENT U. L. REV. 343, 343 (1999) (Winthrop "called his remarks, 'A
Model of Christian Charity.' In them, Winthrop reminded his fellow travelers that
they had left their home in England, not for riches or their own glory, but for the
glory of God. They had left to establish a people devoted to the service of God and
to model for all the world a people that lived in a holy covenant with their God. The
travelers were to form a 'city on a hill."') (citation omitted)).
45. RICHARD T. HUGHES, MYTHS AMERICA LIVES BY 22-23 (2003); see also
JON MEACHAM, AMERICAN GOSPEL: GOD, THE FOUNDING FATHERS, AND THE
MAKING OF A NATION 37-39 (2006); MICHAEL B. OREN, POWER, FAITH AND
FANTASY 84 (2007) ("The Puritans concluded that they were the heirs to that
contract [covenant], a New Israel embarked on a second Exodus from slavery to
freedom, destined for a Promised Land. Impelled by that sense of chosenness, the
Pilgrims journeyed from England to Holland and from there to Plymouth Rock, their
stepping-stone to salvation.").
46. Robert N. Bellah, Is There a Common American Culture?, 66 J. AM.
ACAD. RELIGION 613, 618 (1998) ("The hill belonged to the native Americans, and if
the other Puritans were inclined to overlook that, Roger Williams wasn't.").
47. In the form of Protestant, Catholic, Mormon, Jehovah's Witness, and
Orthodox Christians; Reform, Reconstructionists, Conservative, and Orthodox
Judaism; Sunni and Shia Muslims; Zen, Theravada, and Tibetan Buddhism; as well
as Baha'is, Zoroastrians, Unitarians, Native Americans, and New Age groups. PEW
FORUM ON RELIGION & PUBLIC LIFE, supra note 3, at 5-11.
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as a corporation sole. 4 8 Often lead by charismatic leaders and business-
minded trustees and directors surrounded by bankers, lawyers,
accountants, and consultants, these religious organizations operate as
lucrative corporate enterprises driven by market principles of growth and
sustainability. Those formed under not-for-profit statutes bear state
charters, articles of incorporation, constitutions, bylaws, and Internal
Revenue Code section 501(c)(3) tax exemptions, and, at the
organizational level, are virtually indistinguishable from secular
corporations. Those not careful to maintain the "wall of separation"
between their ecclesiastical and secular sides risk slipping into the stream
of commerce where their theology becomes a packaged, marketed, and
distributed commodity, and their internal disputes take the shape of the
kinds of internecine conflicts that infect the internal affairs of private,
for-profit corporations. The internal disputes of religious organizations
have long mirrored those in corporate America and secular society.
Historically, the nation's court dockets have been pockmarked with
claims arising out of internal disputes within religious organizations for
breach of contract,49 wrongful discharge, breach of fiduciary duty,"
48. BASSETT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3:2, at 3-11 to -12 ("The DePaul Center for
Church/State Studies surveyed 261 national level religious organizations in the
United States to determine what type of legal structure these groups use to carry out
their affairs. This study found that 87% of religious organizations in the United
States use a religious nonprofit corporation legal form in some manner.") (citations
omitted). See also William S. Bassett, Religious Organizations and the State: The
Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity and the Civil Courts, in CHRISTIANITY AND LAW: AN
INTRODUCTION 293, 296 (John Witte, Jr. & Frank S. Alexander eds., 2008) ("Few
American churches or religious organizations now are unincorporated associations.
Most are incorporated under state statutes as non-profit corporations, as religious
corporations, or as corporations sole.").
49. See, e.g., Minker v. Balt. Annual Conference of United Methodist Church,
894 F.2d 1354 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (involving a minister who sued his church for breach
of contract and age discrimination).
50. See, e.g., Vann v. Guildfield Missionary Baptist Church, 452 F. Supp. 2d
651 (W.D. Va. 2006) (involving a pastor who sued his church for wrongful
termination).
51. See, e.g., Askew v. Trs. of Gen. Assembly of the Church of Lord Jesus
Christ of the Apostolic Faith, Inc., 644 F. Supp. 2d 584 (E.D. Pa. 2009), aff'd, 684
F.3d 413 (3d Cir. 2012) (regarding allegations by a congregational church member
that the pastor and trustees misappropriated and wasted church assets and funds).
99
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discrimination, 5 2 defamation,5 3 trademark infringement,54 invasion of
55 . 56
privacy, intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress,
conversion, fraud, theft,57 and sexual abuse.5 8  In a secular, corporate
context, these types of disputes amount to nothing more than a routine
day at the office for a court. When a religious corporation is a party to
the litigation, however, the routine is interrupted by the consideration
courts must give to the Constitution's First Amendment Religion Clauses
that prohibit courts from unwarranted involvement in religious affairs.
This consideration is shaped by the corporate form of the religious
organization. For example, a religious organization formed as a trustee
corporation has an internal governing structure different from one that is
52. See, e.g., Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 295 (3d Cir. 2006)
(discussing a former chaplain of private college's suit claiming "gender
discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII," as well as "civil conspiracy,
negligent retention and supervision, fraudulent misrepresentation, and breach of
contract").
53. See, e.g., Drevlow v. Lutheran Church, Mo. Synod, 991 F.2d 468 (8th Cir.
1993) (involving an ordained minister who sued Synod for placing false information
in his personnel file that affected his employment opportunities); see also Orugua v.
Archdiocese of Omaha, 2008 WL 818935 (D. Neb. March 24, 2008) (involving
claims by a priest that he was reassigned based on false accusations).
54. See, e.g., Gen. Conference Corp. of Seventh-Day Adventists v. McGill,
617 F.3d 402 (6th Cir. 2010) (addressing a church's trademark infringement action
against a former member).
55. See, e.g., Ogle v. Church of God, 153 F.App'x. 371 (6th Cir. 2005) (not
recommended for publication) (involving Bishop who claimed that the church, inter
alia, invaded his privacy in refusing to reinstate him to the ministry following
investigation for his alleged misconduct).
56. See, e.g., Connor v. Archdiocese of Phila., 975 A.2d 1084 (Pa. 2009)
(discussing parents' claims against their child's parochial school for many violations
including intentional infliction of emotional distress after their child was expelled for
possessing a penknife).
57. See, e.g., Abrams v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y., Inc., 723
N.E.2d 1161 (111. 1999) (unpublished table decision) (addressing plaintiffs claims
that the defendants engaged in a "conspiracy to defraud").
58. See, e.g., Doe v. Liberatore, 478 F. Supp. 2d 742 (M.D. Pa. 2007)
(involving claims by plaintiff that he was sexually abused by a priest when he was a
teen parishioner).
59. US CONST. amend. I; Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 710 (1976).
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formed as a membership corporation.60 An organization formed as a
corporation sole will have an internal organizational structure different
from both.61  Because a First Amendment Religion Clause analysis is
driven by an organization's internal organizational structure, it is
essential to distinguish the more common and traditional corporate forms
of religious organizations. The most common forms are, as mentioned,
the trustee corporation, the membership corporation, and the corporation
sole.62
A. The Trustee Corporation
The trustee corporation is one of the first corporate forms
adopted for use by religious organizations in this country.63 Its advent
was the result of a shift in the paradigm that dominated the relationship
64
between Church and State prior to the American Revolution. Prior to
the Revolution, the relationship between Church and State largely
mirrored that of England where the Church was an establishment of the
65
State. In this paradigm, the King had the sole and exclusive right to
grant corporate charters as a privilege and no religious corporation could
exist without his approval. The same winds that fanned the flames of
60. BASSETT ET AL., supra note 3, §§ 3:22, at 3-72 to -74, 4:3, at 4-117 to -118.
(discussing how trustee forms of church organization concentrates power into the
upper levels of church hierarchy, while membership corporations are the most
democratic forms of church organization).
61. Id. § 3:56, at 3-162 ("The corporation sole is the incorporation of the office
of the bishop of a local diocese. The corporation sole lacks the usual trappings of a
corporation.... It does not have a board of directors, officers, stock, bylaws, official
minutes, seal, or even a corporate name.").
62. See id. § 3:3, at 3-12; Paul G. Kauper & Stephen C. Ellis, Religious
Corporations and the Law, 71 MICH. L.REV. 1499, 1538 (1973).
63. See Kauper & Ellis, supra note 62, at 1511.
64. Id. at 1509-10; see also MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE
WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY
43-47 (1965).
65. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 62, at 1504-05; see also Carl Zollman, Nature
ofAmerican Religious Corporations, 14 MICH. L. REV. 37, 37-38 (1916).
66. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 62, at 1504. See also Douglas Amer
Development of the American Law of Corporations, 55 SMU L. REV. 23, 28-31
(2002) (discussing the analysis of Sir Edward Coke, Chief Justice of the King's
Bench, in the 1612 Case of Sutton's Hospital, wherein Coke set forth four ways in
101
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freedom and independence during the Revolution, however, caused a
shift in the paradigm from incorporation by special privilege to
67
incorporation by general incorporation laws and acts. One of the first
outcomes of this paradigm shift was the trustee corporation.
which a corporation could be created: "(1) by common law, as by the King himself;
(2) by the authority of Parliament; (3) by the King himself through a charter; and (4)
by prescription").
67. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 62, at 1510 ("The old system of special charters
had proven to be a means of establishing favored religious bodies, and states began
to enact statutes that granted the corporate form to all bodies that could comply with
certain minimal prerequisites. Such incorporated bodies were no longer seen as
favorites of the state but as sectarian agencies that had been accorded the benefit of a
secular legal form with which they might more effectively achieve their stated goals
and purposes.").
One of the earlier general incorporation laws was the New York Act of 1784,
the preamble of which set forth reasons that are representative of the reasons state
legislatures subscribed to the paradigm shift:
Whereas by the thirty-eighth Article of the Constitution of the
State of New York, it is ordained, determined and declared,
that free capital Exercise and Enjoyment of religious
Profession and Worship, without Discrimination or Preference
should forever thereafter be allowed within this State to all
Mankind, provided that the Liberty of Conscience thereby
granted, should not be so construed, as to excuse Acts of
Licentiousness, or justify Practices inconsistent with the Peace
or Safety of this State.
And whereas, many of the Churches, Congregations, and
religious Societies in this State (while it was a Colony) have
been put to great Difficulties to support the public Worship of
God, by reason of the illiberal and partial Distribution of
Charters of Incorporation to religious Societies, whereby many
Charitable and well disposed Persons have been prevented
from Contributing to the Support of Religion, for want of
proper Persons authorized by law to take charge of their pious
Donations, and many Estates purchased and given for the
Support of religious Societies, now rest in private hands, to the
great Insecurity of the Societies for whose Benefit they were
purchased or given, and to the no less Disquiet of many of the
good People of this State.
And whereas, it is the duty of all Wise, Free and Virtuous
Governments to countenance and encourage virtue and
religion, and to remove every Lett or Impediment to the
Growth and Prosperity of the People, and to enable every
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As progeny of the new general incorporation laws, the trustee
corporation not only eliminated favored status of the state as a
precondition to receiving a corporate charter, but it also offered
unincorporated religious organizations the right and privilege to hold
69property. Prior to the passage of general incorporation laws,
unincorporated religious bodies could gather and worship, but they could
not hold title to property.7o Traditionally, property of unincorporated
religious organizations and associations was held in trust by individuals
(trustees) for the benefit of the organization.7 This arrangement worked
fine as long as the relationship between the individuals acting as trustees
and the body of worshipers on whose behalf the trustees were holding the
72
property was on good terms. If the relationship soured or a trustee
died, questions of who was entitled to the trustee's interest in the
73
property arose.
The trustee corporation offered a ready solution to this
dilemma. The solution was to incorporate the trustees who were
already in title to the property, or, where no trustees previously existed,
religious Denomination to provide for the Decent and
Honorable Support of Divine Worship, agreeable to the
dictates of Conscience and Judgment ....
Id. (quoting 1784 N.Y. Laws 21); see also HOWE, supra note 64, at 45-46.
68. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 62, at 1510-11.
69. Id.
70. Id. (Under the common law, an unincorporated religious associations were
"incapable of taking or holding property in its own name"); see also Carl Zollman,
Classes of American Religious Corporations, 13 MICH. L. REV. 566, 573 (1914-
1915) ("When early in our history territorial parishes began to disintegrate, voluntary
societies for religious worship were formed by those who severed their connection
with the parishes. These societies generally existed for a time in an unincorporated
form. This arrangement worked well enough as long as no property was acquired.
When, however, property accumulated the question who was to hold it was at once
presented. It could not be held in the name of all the members as they were too
numerous and changing. It could not be held in the name adopted by the society as
that was not recognized by law.").
71. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 62, at 1511-12; see also Zollman, supra note
70, at 573.
72. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 62, at 1511-12; see also Zollman, supra note
70, at 574.
73. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 62, at 1511-12; Zollman, supra note 70, at 574.
74. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 62, at 1511-12; see also Zollman, supra note
70, at 574.
have the membership of the religious organization elect a body of
trustees who would then be incorporated under state law.75 As a formal
corporation, the trustees then held the organization's property and
conducted the affairs of the religious organization pursuant to statutory
76
authority and limitations. Today, the trustee corporation is more
common in hierarchical religious organizations and is recognized in
thirty jurisdictions, including the District of Columbia.78
B. The Membership Corporation
By the middle of the nineteenth century, the limitations of the
trustee corporate form began to show. Courts that were called upon to
consider intra-organizational controversies between the trustees and their
congregations were increasingly put in a position of resolving these
issues by interpreting religious theology.79 The implied trust doctrine is
an outgrowth of the courts' consideration of these controversies.so
Essentially, the implied trust doctrine meant that the property held in
trust by the trustees of a trustee corporation was obliged to be applied to
the uses of the theology of the religious organization when it was first
created. This meant that if the organization was incorporated when the
membership was all Methodist, a change in a majority of the membership
over time to Presbyterian, the trustees were bound by trust doctrine to
continue to allow the property to be used only for Methodist worship.82
As it had in 1784 when it was one of the first states to pass a
general incorporation law, in 1854, New York once again assumed a
vanguard role. This time, it was the New York Court of Appeals
75. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 62, at 1511; see also Zollman, supra note 70, at
574-75; BASSETr ET AL., supra note 3, § 3:22, at 3-72 to -73.
76. BASSETr ET AL., supra note 3, § 1:30, at 1-62.
77. Id. § 4:2, at 4-8.
78. Id. § 3:22, at 3-72.
79. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 62, at 1511; see also Zollman, supra note 70, at
576-77.
80. See Kauper & Ellis, supra note 62, at 1511 ("[T]he legislatures of the
states that adopted this form granted perpetual succession without the necessity of a
transfer of property to some different entity and without a change in existing
relationships."); see also infra Parts II, III.A, IV.A.
81. HOWE, supra note 64, at 46.
82. See id.
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contradicting decades of jurisprudence interpreting its 1784 statute. 8 3
The court said that the better interpretation of the statute which provided
for the formation of corporations was that the members of the religious
body actually constitute the corporation with the trustees acting as its
officers, not the trustees as the actual corporation with the members
forming no part of it. This decision essentially described and defined a
membership corporation, where it is the membership that is
incorporated, and the membership holds and controls organizational
property and conducts the affairs of the organization in accordance with
the organization's custom and rules, charter or articles of incorporation,
and bylaws.
Today, the membership corporation is recognized in a majority
18
of jurisdictions and is found more often in religious organizations of
congregational polity.89 The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act 9 0
uses the membership corporate form as a general model for religious
corporations.91 The membership corporation is recognized by thirty-
eight states and the District of Columbia.92
C. The Corporation Sole
The third, and least used, of the three most common corporate
religious forms is the corporation sole. The corporation sole has a
governing structure vastly different from that of the trustee corporation
and the membership corporation. As mentioned, in the trustee
corporation the elected trustees control the corporation,93 and in the
83. Robertson v. Bullions, 11 N.Y. 243 (1854). See also Kauper & Ellis, supra
note 62, at 1512; HOWE, supra note 64, at 46-47.
84. See Robertson, 11 N.Y. at 247-48.
85. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 62, at 1512.
86. See id at 1512-13.
87. Id.; BASSETr ET AL., supra note 3, § 3:20, at 3-69.
88. BASSETT ET AL., supra note 3, § 1:23, at 1-51.
89. Id.
90. The Revised Model Nonprofit Corporation Act has been adopted in
twenty-one states with some form of modification. See id. § 1:23, at 1-52.
91. Id. § 3:53, at 3-145.
92. Id. § 1:23, at 1-52.
93. See id § 3:56, at 3-162 ("The first corporate forms adopted were trustee
corporations, in which title vested in an appointed or elected board of trustees.").
105
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membership corporation, the congregation controls.94  The corporation
sole, in stark contrast to the arguably elitist structure of the trustee
corporation and the more egalitarian structure of the membership
corporation, is literally a "one-man corporation" in which the office of
a titled position is incorporated.96 The corporate property and powers are
then controlled and exercised by the individual holding the office. 97
Subsequent office holders inherit the corporation's property and power.98
The corporation sole is particularly attractive to hierarchical
religions where authority is concentrated in an office, 99 such as Roman
Catholicism, Episcopalianism, Eastern Orthodox, and the Church of
Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.1oo The corporation sole is strictly a
creation of positive state law. This means that a corporation sole can
only be created by a specific legislative act.102 Currently, seventeen
states statutorily recognize the corporation sole while a minimum of
103
eight have specially chartered corporations sole.
PART II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT'S RELIGION CLAUSES: ORIGINS AND
EVOLUTION
In September 1789, a joint committee of the House and Senate of
the First Congress approved a draft copy of the Bill of Rights that
94. Id. § 1:23, at 1-49 to -50.
95. Kauper & Ellis, supra note 62, at 1540.
96. BASSETT ET AL., supra note 3, § 3:56 at 3-162 ("The corporation sole is the
incorporation of the office of the bishop of a local diocese.").
97. Id. § 3:56, at 3-162.
98. Id.
99. Id. § 3:56, at 3-159.
100. Id ("[A]bout one-third of the Roman Catholic diocesan bishops in the
United States are corporations sole. The corporation sole is also used by Episcopal
dioceses, various other [sic] Orthodox dioceses in this country, as well as the
presiding bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints.").
101. Id. § 3:56, at 3-160 & n.11 ("The only federally incorporated corporation
sole is the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Washington, D.C., established by special
act of Congress in 1948." (citing 62 Stat 355 (1948)).
102. Id. § 3:56, at 3-160.
103. Id. §§ 3:56, at 3-163; 3:56, at 3-160 to -161.
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contained twelve amendments.'0 The third of these twelve amendments,
the result of a summer filled with debates and consideration of over
twenty-five different drafts,'0 5 would ultimately become the U.S.
106
Constitution's First Amendment, containing the Religion Clauses.
The First Amendment opens with the phrase that contains the
two Religion Clauses: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, [("Establishment Clause")] or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof [("Free Exercise Clause")]. .. ,,o While the
original intent of these clauses continues to be debated among jurists and
scholars,'os the general consensus is that the purpose of the Religion
104. JOH-N WITTE. JR., RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
EXPERIMENT 89 (3d ed. 2011); see also AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 8 (1998).
105. WITTE, supra note 104, at 89.
106. AMAR, supra note 104, at 20.
107. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
108. WITTE, supra note 104, at 89 ("What is the original understanding of the
First Amendment? Is there one interpretation, or many? Is it even useful to probe
such questions? The final text of the First Amendment itself has no plain meaning.
The congressional record holds no Rosetta Stone for easy interpretation; there is no
'smoking gun' that puts all evidentiary disputes to rest. Congress considered twenty-
five separate drafts of the religion clauses . . . ten different ones tendered by the
states, ten debated in the House, five more debated in the Senate, and the final draft
forged by the joint committee of the House and Senate. The congressional record
holds no dispositive argument against any one of the drafts and few clear clues on
why the sixteen words that comprise the final text were chosen."); see also Mark
David Hall, Jefferson Walls and Madisonian Lines: The Supreme Court's Use of
History in Religion Clause Cases, 85 OR. L. REV. 563 (2006) (using empirical data
to analyze how history has affected Supreme Court's interpretation of the Religion
Clauses); Vincent Phillip Mutioz, The Original Meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause: The Evidence from the First Congress, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 1083
(2008); Steven H. Shriffrin, The Pluralistic Foundations of the Religion Clauses, 90
CORNELL L. REv. 9, 14 (2004) ("[T]he Framers themselves did not agree upon the
appropriate relationship between religion and government. And furthermore, even if
they had agreed, it is not clear that a legal theory requiring us to be bound in the
twenty-first century by the will of a group of eighteenth century white male agrarian
slaveholders would have a lot to recommend it."). One scholar also wrote:
[Tihe scope of the religion clauses are more simply answered
than some distinguished scholars have suggested. Two
corollaries are that the Supreme Court has not committed a
gross blunder in developing the scope of those clauses, and
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Clauses was to protect religion from the national government. 109
However, in its first Free Exercise case a hundred years after ratification,
the Supreme Court seemingly failed to recognize this protection when it
held that a federal law could prohibit the free exercise of religion.no
Twenty years later, when considering its first Establishment Clause case,
the Supreme Court, in like fashion, decided that the use of a
congressional appropriation to fund construction at a hospital run by
nuns affiliated with a Catholic religious society was not a violation of
that clause.11
that the widely held view of the clauses as having a dual
character is sound.
Kent Greenawalt, Common Sense About Original and Subsequent Understandings of
the Religion Clauses, 8 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 479, 480 (2006). See also STEVEN D.
SMITH, FOREORDAINED FAILURE: THE QUEST FOR A CONSTITUTIONAL PRINCIPLE OF
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 18 (1995) ("Judges and scholars have assumed that the religion
clauses contain both a federalist element and a substantive principle or right .... ).
109. WITTE, supra note 104, at 53-54 ("The concern was to protect church
affairs from state intrusion, the clergy from the magistracy, church properties from
state encroachment, and ecclesiastical rules and rites from political coercion and
control."). See also United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 674-75 (1998) ("The
currently received understanding of the Bill of Rights as instituted 'to curtail and
restrict the general powers granted to the Executive, Legislative, and Judicial
Branches' of the National Government defined in the original constitutional articles .
... (quoting New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 716 (1971)
(Black, J., concurring) (per curiam))); Stephen L. Carter, Reflections on the
Separation of Church and State, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 293, 294 (2002) ("The purpose of
the separation was not to protect the state from religious believers but to protect the
church in its work of salvation from the corruption of the state."); Carl H. Esbeck,
Religion and the First Amendment: Some Causes of the Recent Confusion, 42 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 883, 883-87 (2001).
110. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 162 (1878) (validating a
congressional ban on the practice of polygamy). Chief Justice Morrison Waite,
delivering the opinion of the Court, stated, "[t]he inquiry is not as to the power of
Congress to prescribe criminal laws for the Territories, but as to the guilt of one who
knowingly violates a law which has been properly enacted, if he entertains a
religious belief that the law is wrong." Id.
111. Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (rejecting claim of taxpayer-
citizen that government funding of non-profit hospital operated by order of Roman
Catholic nuns was a violation of the Establishment Clause).
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The Religion Clauses were originally applicable to only regulate
Congress and not the states,112 because religious issues were viewed as
purely state matters." 3  The result was that some states supported
churches, some banned non-Christian religious organizations, and others
had religious qualifications to hold public office. 114 John Witte describes
the scene as a "patchwork quilt of laws on religious liberty .. . . Part
of this "patchwork quilt" was state-required congregationalism whose
tenets of majority-rule interfered with the governance rights of
hierarchical organizations." Fundamental to a religious organization of
hierarchical polity is an ecclesiastical tribunal that is superior to its
membership. 1 7  When such an organization is compelled to adopt a
congregational, majority-rule model of governance, its religious liberties
are affected." 8 Another part of this "patchwork" was the application by
some states of the laws of "'implied trust' and the 'departure-from-
112. See PHILIP HAMBURGER, SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE 435-36
(2002). See also Permoli v. Municipality No. I of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.)
589, 609 (1845) ("The Constitution makes no provision for protecting the citizens of
the respective states in their religious liberties; this is left to the state constitutions
and laws .... ); Barron v. City of Bait., 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250 (1833) ("Had the
framers of these amendments intended them to be limitations on the powers of the
state governments, they would have imitated the framers of the original constitution,
and have expressed that intention."). Cf Greenawalt, supra note 108, at 481
(describing three theories regarding the scope of the Religion Clauses: that they
"created ordinary substantive constraints, set jurisdictional limits, withdrew the
subject of religion from Congress altogether, or performed some combination of
these legal operations.").
I13. WITTE, supra note 104, at 109; see also HOWE, supra note 64, at 70.
114. AMAR, supra note 104, at 32-33 ("In 1789, at least six states had
government-supported churches-Congregationalism held sway in New Hampshire,
Massachusetts, and Connecticut . . . while Maryland, South Carolina, and Georgia
each featured a more general form of establishment in their respective state
constitutions") (citation omitted).
115. WITTE, supra note 104, at 109.
116. HOWE, supra note 64, at 41-47; see also JAY ALAN SEKULOW,
WITNESSING THEIR FAITH: RELIGIOUS INFLUENCE ON SUPREME COURT JUSTICES AND
THEIR OPINIONS 77 (2006).
117. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 722 (1871).
118. HOWE, supra note 64; see also SEKULOW, supra note 116, at 77.
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doctrine' standard.19 Under this standard, property contributed to a
church was held in trust for the benefit of the person(s) making the
contribution and those departing from traditional church doctrine
forfeited any rights to the property.120 In Watson v. Jones, the Supreme
Court found that these laws abridge religious liberties when courts, in
keeping with the doctrine, "[inquired] and [decided] ... not only ... the
nature and power of . .. church judicatories, but what is the true standard
of faith... ."121
In 1940, a significant change occurred when the Supreme Court
applied the Free Exercise Clause to a state for the first time.122 It did this
in a creative, unusual, and controversial way: by incorporating the First
Amendment into the Fourteenth Amendment, and then asserting the state
had abridged the claimant's Fourteenth Amendment right to "liberty"
123
without due process. The linchpin to make this method work was the
notion that the rights embodied in the First Amendment's Religion
Clauses are religious "liberties" protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment's liberty guaranties.124 Seven years later, the Court repeated
the incorporation process, this time subjecting a state law to the
Establishment Clause. 12 5 There has been no dearth of comment and
119. Arlin M. Adams & William R. Hanlon, Jones v. Wolf: Church Autonomy
and the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1298-99
(1980).
120. See Kurt T. Lash, The Second Adoption of the Establishment Clause: The
Rise of the Nonestablishment Principle, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1085, 1111 (1995) for a
good explanation of the how the implied trust/departure-from-doctrine standard
evolved from an English legal principle known as the Pearson Rule and how the
Pearson Rule was ultimately rejected by American courts.
121. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727.
122. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (holding that the
Establishment Clause applies to states because "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment has
rendered legislatures of the states as incompetent as Congress to enact such laws").
123. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § I ("No state . .. shall ... deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law. . . .").
124. See Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 303 ("The fundamental concept of liberty
embodied in that [Fourteenth] Amendment embraces the liberties guaranteed by the
First Amendment."); HAMBURGER, supra note 112, at 436, 438-40.
125. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (holding
that a state law authorizing reimbursement to Catholic parents for bus transportation
of their children on busses operated by the public transportation system was not an
establishment of religion issue).
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criticism on the use of. the Fourteenth Amendment in this way.126
According to Witte, it was the abridgement of religious rights by the
states that motivated the Supreme Court to discover a way to make states
subject to First Amendment religious guaranties.127 The "way," it turns
out, was to use the Fourteenth Amendment to apply the protections of the
First Amendment to the states.128 Accordingly, in Cantwell v.
Connecticut,129 the Supreme Court agreed with the plaintiff/appellant
Newton Cantwell, a Jehovah's Witness, that the state statute prohibiting
him from soliciting contributions for a religious cause without a
license' 30 was "offensive to the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment," denying him and his co-defendants their freedom of
speech and free exercise of religion.131 Relying on the Free Exercise
Clause, the Supreme Court said:
126. Mark DeWolfe Howe's position was that the drafters and adopters never
considered that the Fourteenth Amendment would have any impact on religious
organization. HOWE, supra note 64, at 72-73. The Supreme Court had considered it
to be primarily a "protection of the Negro against abusive state action." Id. at 132.
See also AMAR, supra note 104, at 139-40 (discussing the three main approaches to
interpreting the relationship between the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth
Amendment: (1) the Fourteenth Amendment never incorporated any of the Bill of
Rights (advocated by Justice Felix Frankfurter); (2) the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporated all of the Bill of Rights (advocated by Justice Hugo Black); (3) whether
or not the Fourteenth Amendment incorporates any of the Bill of Rights should be
determined on a right by right basis (the position of Justice William Brennan)).
127. WITTE, supra note 104, at 109-10; see also HAMBURGER, supra note 112,
at 448.
128. See WITTE, supra note 104, at 109-10; HAMBURGER, supra note 112, at
122-23. See also Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 62 (1947) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring) (discussing the opinions of Supreme Court justices who dealt with
incorporation issues following the passing of the Fourteenth Amendment);
HAMBURGER, supra note 112, at 439 (noting the argument among justices as to
whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights to the states or
whether it secured fundamental rights of individuals from the states); SMITH, supra
note 108, at 35. Cf WITTE, supra note 104, at 126 (referencing the argument that the
incorporation of the religion clauses is contrary to the text and intent of both the First
and Fourteenth Amendments). But see AMAR, supra note 104, at 33-34 (arguing that
a mechanical incorporation of the First Amendment by way of the Fourteenth
Amendment is to make the states subject to a prohibition the First Amendment
exempts them from).
129. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
130. Id. at 303.
131. Id. at 300.
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We hold that the statute, as construed and applied
to the appellants, deprives them of their liberty
without due process of law in contravention of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The fundamental concept
of liberty embodied in that Amendment embraces
the liberties guaranteed by the First Amendment.
The First Amendment declares that Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.
The Fourteenth Amendment has rendered the
legislatures of the states as incompetent as
Congress to enact such laws.132
It was not until 1952 in Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of
the Russian Orthodox Church of North America,'3 though, that the
Supreme Court first submitted an internal church dispute to a First
Amendment Religion Clause analysis.134 Applying the Free Exercise
Clause, the Supreme Court held that a New York statute granting control
of property owned by the Russian Orthodox Church headquartered in
Moscow to an American faction at odds with the Mother Church in
Russia violated the Free Exercise Clause.m"5
The three internal dispute cases considered by the Court prior to
Kedroff were each decided on common law, not constitutional,
principles.136 In Kedroff the Supreme Court, for the first time, relied on
the First Amendment in its consideration of a religious organization's
132. Id. at 303.
133. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
134. Id. See also Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 730 (1976) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("The year 1952
was the first occasion on which this Court examined what limits the First and
Fourteenth Amendments might place upon the ability of the States to entertain and
resolve disputes over church property.").
135. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 119. See also Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at
730 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("This Court . . . held [in Kedroff that] the statute was
a violation of the Free Exercise Clause. . . .").
136. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 15-19
(1929); Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131, 137-40 (1872); Watson v.
Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679, 702 (1871); WITTE, supra note 104, at 244 ("The
Supreme Court's earliest cases on religion, beginning in 1815, were based on federal
common law, not on the First Amendment. . . .").
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internal dispute, and, in so doing, transformed those common law
principles into a principle of constitutional law.' 3 7
PART III. RELIGION CLAUSE DOCTRINE IN THE COMMON LAW ERA
As a whole, Religion Clause doctrine applicable to disputes
within religious corporations has grown out of cases involving only those
that are hierarchically organized and governed.138 Since first considering
an internal religious dispute over one hundred and forty years ago, only
one case has involved a dispute with a religious corporation of
congregational polity, making the doctrine rather hierarchical-centric.13
The genesis of the Court's hierarchical-centric journey to development of
the doctrine began with its choice of solutions. Prior to the Civil War,
the individual states had used one of three approaches when considering
intra-church disputes.140 Some states used trust law principles, some
deferred to the religious organization's hierarchy, while others
subscribed to a congregational model of majority rule.14 1  In the
aftermath of the Civil War, the Supreme Court chose to mark its first
consideration of an intra-church dispute by reliance on a common law
rule of deference to the religious organization's hierarchy.142 The
137. HOWE, supra note 64, at 89 ("The Kedroff case established a rule of
constitutional law, a rule, that is, which compels all states and the federal
government, through whatever agency they may act, to abide by its requirements.");
WITTE, supra note 104, at 249 ("Kedroff thus converted Watson into a constitutional
principle....").
138. See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565
U.S. _, 132 S. Ct. 694 (2011); Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Serb. E.
Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. 696; Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v.
Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (per curiam); Presbyterian
Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian Church, 393
U.S. 440 (1969); Kedroff, 344 U.S. 94; Gonzalez, 280 U.S. 1; Watson, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 679.
139. Bouldin, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131. Except for Bouldin, all other United
States Supreme Court First Amendment Religion Clause cases considering internal
disputes of religious organizations have involved only religious corporations that are
hierarchically organized and governed.
140. HOWE, supra note 64, at 82.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 83.
doctrinal analysis that sprung from this rule was based squarely on
organizational structure.
A. Watson v. Jones
The organizational structure of religious corporations has been a
key component in First Amendment Religion Clause analysis of intra-
church disputes since first being introduced by Justice Samuel Freeman
Miller in the 1871 case, Watson v. Jones.143 In Watson, the Supreme
Court declared that courts must abide by the decisions of the highest
tribunal within the religious organization regarding ecclesiastical matters
144
such as questions of discipline, faith, governance, custom, or law.
Relying exclusively on common law principles with no reference to the
First Amendment or its Religion Clauses, the Supreme Court's opinion
laid out the rules a court must observe when considering internal disputes
of religious organizations.145 Structurally, it rested its analysis squarely
on the polity of the religious organization. In religious corporations with
143. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 679. The Supreme Court has since
considered internal disputes within religious corporations in many cases. See, e.g.,
Little v. First Baptist Church, Crestwood, 475 U.S. 1148 (1986), cert. denied; Jones,
443 U.S. 595; Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. 696; Md. & Va. Eldership, 396
U.S. 367; Presbyterian Church in the U.S., 393 U.S. 440; Gonzalez, 280 U.S. 1;
Kedroff 344 U.S. 94; Bouldin, 82 U.S. 131.
144. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727.
145. Id. When the form of government is a congregation, distinguishing legal
principles apply: "[T]he rights of such bodies to the use of the property must be
determined by the ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations. If the
principle of government in such cases is that the majority rules, then the numerical
majority of members must control . . . ." Id. at 725. When the form of government is
hierarchical, the following legal principals apply:
[W]e think the rule of action which should govern the civil
courts, founded in a broad and sound view of the relations of
church and state under our system of laws, and supported by a
preponderating weight of judicial authority is, that, whenever
the questions of discipline, or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule,
custom, or law have been decided by the highest of these
church judicatories to which the matter has been carried, the
legal tribunals must accept such decisions as final, and as
binding on them, in their application to the case before them.
Id. at 727.
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a congregational form of government, a court is bound by the decision of
a majority of its members.14 6  In those with a hierarchical form of
government, a court must heed the decision of the highest governing
body within the corporation.147 Watson was the Supreme Court's initial
entry into an area that was heretofore the exclusive domain of the
states.14 8 A domain that was as congregational-centric in its analysis of
internal disputes of religious organizations as today's is hierarchical-
centric.149
The horrors of the Civil War left no area of American life
untouched. Religious life was no exception. Pulpits in both the North
and the South proclaimed the righteousness of their respective takes on
slavery and did so with an intensity matched only by their religious
beliefs. 1o The Presbyterian Church in the United States, a hierarchically
organized and governed religious organization,' 5' was no less vocal.
When its General Assembly, its national ruling body, expressed its
support for the North and President Abraham Lincoln's Emancipation
Proclamation, a schism resulted along proslavery and antislavery lines.152
A month after the Civil War ended,153 this schism became even more
pronounced when the General Assembly directed the Presbyteries, Board
of Missions, and Church Sessions to require any persons who had sided
with the Confederacy to "repent and forsake these sins" as a precondition
146. Id. at 725.
147. Id. at 727.
148. HOWE, supra note 64, at 80; see also SEKULOW, supra note 116, at 69.
149. HOWE, supra note 64, at 82 (noting that before the Civil War, there was a
"startling tendency of state courts and state legislatures to build doctrine upon a
congregational principle-to let today's majority decide a church's immediate
destiny, without regard to the wishes and expectations of its founders or the
preferences of its hierarchy").
150. See AHLSTROM, supra note 32, at 670-90.
151. The Presbyterian Church in the United States was a hierarchically
organized Christian religious organization governed by "a written Confession of
Faith, Form of Government, Book of Discipline, and Directory for Worship."
Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 681. As such, it consisted of several "judicatories"
consisting of, in descending order, a General Assembly, the national level judicatory,
followed by Synods, Presbyteries, and Church Sessions. Id.
152. Id. at 690-93.
153. The Civil War ended on April 9, 1865 when General Robert E. Lee
surrendered at Appomattox, Virginia. WILLIAM MARVEL, LEE'S LAST RETREAT: THE
FLIGHT TO APPOMATTOX 158-81 (Gary W. Gallagher ed., 2002).
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to admission as members, ministers or missionaries. 5 4 A few months
later, in September 1865, the Presbytery of Louisville, Kentucky
repudiated these instructions in its own publication.15 5  The General
Assembly of 1866 responded by offering it an opportunity to repent and
conform or risk being dissolved. With the Louisville Presbytery
entrenched in its position, by June 1867, the General Assembly declared
that both the Presbytery of Louisville and the Synod of Kentucky were
"in no sense a true and lawful Synod and Presbytery in connection with
and under the care and authority of the General Assembly of the
Presbyterian Church in the United States of America."15' This led to a
division within the Louisville Presbytery, with the proslavery adherents
leaving the Presbyterian Church of the United States and joining the
Presbyterian Church of the Confederate States.Iss
Thus, in January 1866, the congregation of the Walnut Street
Presbyterian Church in Louisville, Kentucky had become divided along
the same proslavery-antislavery lines,15 9 with a majority of its members
supporting the General Assembly's stance against slavery, while a
minority of its members embraced the proslavery position.160 Each
faction claimed that it was the rightful owner of the church and its
property.'6 1 The General Assembly declared that the majority of the
congregation was the lawful church.162 The minority faction objected,163
arguing that pursuant to the laws of "implied trust and the departure from
doctrine" standard applicable to religious societies, the minority faction
should be considered the true owner of the church and its property.164
The essence of this argument was that, under the "'implied trust' and
'departure-from doctrine' standard," church property was held in trust to
benefit the growth and development of the church and any departure
154. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 691.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 691-92.
157. Id. at 692
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 694.
161. Id. at 694-97.
162. Id. at 694.
163. See Lash, supra note 120, at 1115.
164. Adams & Hanlon, supra note 119, at 1298-99.
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from traditional church doctrine resulted in a forfeiture of rights to the
property. Therefore, argued the minority, the antislavery stance of the
majority was a departure from doctrine which should result in them
forfeiting all rights to the church's property.
165. Lash, supra note 120, at 1111. See also Paul G. Kauper, Church
Autonomy and the First Amendment: The Presbyterian Church Case, 1969 SUP. CT.
REV. 347, 349-52 (1969).
166. Adams & Hanlon, supra note 119, at 1299. See also Kurt Lash for a
similar argument:
In the 1813 English case, Craigdallie v. Aiknman,
Chancellor Lord Eldon ruled that church property was held
in trust for the persons who had contributed money for the
original acquisition of the church. Developing this principle
in the later case Attorney-General ex rel. Mander v.
Pearson, Lord Eldon declared that church property was
held in trust for the propagation of certain religious
doctrines and that it was the duty of the court to award the
property to the faction adhering to the traditional doctrines
of the church. The so-called "Pearson Rule" was soon
adopted in the new world by way of state common law.
Although application of the Pearson Rule required detailed
examination of church doctrine, such inquiries fit well in a
world where courts routinely decided issues of blasphemy
and proper deportment on the Sabbath. However, just as
theological rationales grew less routine in blasphemy cases,
so the Pearson Rule came under fire as a remnant of
"establishment England." By the 1840s, litigants on the
side of doctrinal innovation began to cite both the state and
federal constitutions for the principle that the state had no
power-and the courts no jurisdiction-to interfere in
matters involving religious doctrine and church
government. As early as 1842, Kentucky courts had
rejected the Pearson Rule, noting that "[t]he judicial eye of
the civil authority of this land of religious liberty, cannot
penetrate the veil of the Church, nor can the arm of this
Court either rend or touch that veil for the forbidden
purpose of vindicating the alleged wrongs of the exscinded
members."
Lash, supra note 120, at 1111-12 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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1. Court Deference to Hierarchical Judicatory
In rejecting this argument, Justice Miller's opinion pointed out
that, historically, cases involving the property rights of religious
organizations have fallen into one of three categories: (1) where the use
of the property is subject to express terms limiting its use to a specific
form of religious doctrine or belief; (2) where property is held by a
religious organization of congregational polity; and, (3) where the
"religious congregation or ecclesiastical body holding the property is but
a subordinate member of some general church organization in which
there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and ultimate
power of control more or less complete, in some supreme judicatory over
the whole membership of that general organization."16 7 According to
Justice Miller, the third category, where the dispute involves the property
rights of hierarchically organized and governed religious organizations
(like the Presbyterian Church of the United States), is the one that is in
"every way the most important."'68 This is so, he declared, because the
cases that fall within this third category showed up more often in the
courts and presented the more difficult questions.169 After so declaring,
he went on to announce the rule of Watson:
In this class of cases we think the rule of action
which should govern the civil courts, founded in a
broad and sound view of the relations of church
and state under our system of laws, and supported
by a preponderating weight of judicial authority is,
that, whenever the questions of discipline, or of
faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have
been decided by the highest of these church
judicatories to which the matter has been carried,
the legal tribunals must accept such decisions as
final, and as binding on them, in their application
to the case before them. 170
167. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 722-23.
168. Id. at 726.
169. Id
170. Id. at 727.
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The rationale for the rule, while making no reference to the
Constitution, was based, nonetheless, on constitutional principles of
religious liberty.171 In rejecting the English doctrine that allowed courts
to "inquire and decide . . . not only . . . the nature and power of . . .
church judicatories, but what is the true standard of faith in the church
organization, and which of the contending parties before the court holds
to this standard," 172 Justice Miller stated that
[i]n this country the full and free right to entertain
any religious belief, to practice any religious
principle, and to teach any religious doctrine which
does not violate the laws of morality and property,
and which does not infringe personal rights, is
conceded to all. The law knows no heresy, and is
committed to the support of no dogma, the
establishment of no sect. The right to organize
voluntary religious associations to assist in the
expression and dissemination of any religious
doctrine, and to create tribunals for the decision of
controverted questions of faith within the
association, and for the ecclesiastical government
of all the individual members, congregations, and
officers within the general association, is
unquestioned. All who unite themselves to such a
body do so with an implied consent to this
government, and are bound to submit to it. But it
would be a vain consent and would lead to the total
subversion of such religious bodies, if any one
aggrieved by one of their decisions could appeal to
the secular courts and have them reversed. It is of
the essence of these religious unions, and of their
right to establish tribunals for the decision of
questions arising among themselves, that those
decisions should be binding in all cases of
171. HOWE, supra note 64, at 82-83.
172. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727.
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ecclesiastical cognizance, subject only to such
appeals as the organism itself provides for.173
The reasoning behind this rationale was that hierarchically
organized and governed religious organizations 74 have their own body
of esoteric laws that civil courts would potentially be incompetent to
adjudicate. When it comes to ecclesiastical matters having to do with
a religious organization's discipline, faith, governance, custom, or law,
so the reasoning goes, only those who are seasoned in the faith and its
tradition, and not the courts, are qualified to render decisions affecting
these matters. And those of sound mind who voluntarily join such
organizations are considered to have consented to the organization's
authority and are bound by the organization's ecclesiastically lawful
decisions. In these circumstances, these individuals, like the court, must
abide by the decision of the organization's highest tribunal.
2. Court Relationship to Congregational Polities
The focus of the Court's decision was clearly on the principles
and doctrine applicable to hierarchically organized and governed
organizations. However, Justice Miller briefly mentioned religious
organizations of congregational polity. He described these religious
organizations as independent organizations "governed solely within
[themselves], either by a majority of its members or by such other local
organism as it may have instituted for the purpose of ecclesiastical
,,177
government .... He continued that "[i]n such cases where there is a
schism [within a religious organization of congregational polity] which
leads to a separation into distinct and conflicting bodies, the rights of
such bodies to the use of the property must be determined by the
173. Id. at 728-29.
174. Justice Miller mentioned, by way of example, and not by way of
limitation, Protestant Episcopal, Methodist Episcopal, and Presbyterian churches. Id.
at 729.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 724-25.
177. Id. at 724.
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ordinary principles which govern voluntary associations."" In other
words, "the majority rules." 79
The congregational model of polity was quite familiar to the
judiciary of the day when it came to resolving intra-church property
disputes. 80  After the Revolutionary War, the church affiliated
municipalities in Massachusetts followed a "congregational tradition"
where each was an autonomous, "self-sufficient" and "self-governing"
majority-rule jurisdiction. The South Carolina Constitution,
established in 1778, not only established Protestantism as the state
religion and expected that each Protestant denomination would become a
state chartered corporation, it mandated that all church ministers be
elected by a majority of its members.182 In 1784, New York adopted a
statute allowing religious organizations to incorporate. 83 An 1854 ruling
by the New York Court of Appeals interpreting that statute held that the
trustees of a religious corporation were bound by the decision of a
majority of the members who benefited by the corporation.184 Mark
DeWolfe Howe suggests, as did Justice Miller,'8 that the preference of
the judiciary for majority-rule, the staple of congregational polities, was
because of its awareness of its incompetence to rule on matters buried in
theology.
Nonetheless, the takeaway of Watson is that courts are bound to
abide by the decisions of the highest judicatory within a religious
organization of hierarchical polity when it comes to questions of
discipline, faith, ecclesiastical rule or governance, custom, or law.' In
religious organizations of congregational polity, however, it is the
majority that rules, unless there are officers within the organization
178. Id. at 725.
179. Id.
180. HOWE, supra note 64, at 82.
181. Id. at 34-35.
182. Id. at 41-42.
183. Act of Apr. 6, 1784, 1 Laws of the State of New York (Samuel Jones &
Richard Varick eds., 1789).
184. Robertson v. Bullions, 11 N.Y. 243 (1854).
185. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 729.
186. HOWE, supra note 64, at 37, 49.
187. Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 727.
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invested with powers of government superior to those of the
.188
congregation.
B. Bouldin v. Alexander
A year after Watson, the Supreme Court refined the common law
rule announced in Watson by holding that it could determine, as between
competing individuals or judicatories, who is the lawful authority of a
religious organization. In Bouldin v. Alexander, an 1872 appeal from
the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, the Court was confronted
with a property dispute within a church of congregational polity.190 The
dispute arose when Albert Bouldin, leader of the Third Colored Baptist
Church of the City of Washington, along with fifteen or so members
loyal to him, took control of the church and locked out trustees adverse
to him.191 The eleven affected trustees representing the interests of a
majority of the membership of the church (ca. 200), filed suit against
Bouldin for, inter alia, return of control of the property to them, the
lawful trustees of the church.192 The trial court agreed with the plaintiffs
and Bouldin appealed.1 9 3
In affirming the trial court, the Supreme Court expressly
recognized that, consistent with the general principles laid down in
Watson, it had no power to consider or rule on ecclesiastical matters such
as who should be members, officers or trustees of the church.1 9 4 It did,
however, have the power to inquire into the organizational structure of a
religious organization in order to determine whether the individuals or
judicatory purporting to act on behalf of the religious organization was
actually authorized to do so.195 In other words, courts may review
whether a church followed its own internal rules and regulations.
Bouldin represents the first, last, and only time the Supreme Court has
188. Id.
189. 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872).
190. Id. at 133.
191. Id. at 134.
192. Id. at 135.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 137, 139-40.
195. Id. at 140.
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considered First Amendment Religion Clause doctrine within the context
of a congregational religious organization.
C. Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
Following Bouldin, the Supreme Court did not consider its next
internal church dispute until 1929. In Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila,'9 7 Raul Rogerio Gonzalez, a ten-year old,
contended that he was entitled to a chaplaincy founded by the terms of an
ancestor's will.' 9 8 Affirming the decision of the Supreme Court of the
Philippine Islands on common law grounds consistent with Watson, the
Court found that Gonzalez's suit against the Archbishop of Manila for
refusal to appoint him to the chaplaincy was a canonical act outside the
purview of the secular courts.199 In deferring to the decision of the
Archbishop, the Supreme Court said that absent "fraud, collusion, or
arbitrariness, the decisions of the proper church tribunals on matters
purely ecclesiastical, although affecting civil rights, are accepted in
litigation before the secular courts as conclusive . . . ." Forty-seven
years later in the 1976 case of Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the
201
U.S. & Canada v. Milivojevich, the Court would declare that this
"fraud, collusion, or arbitrariness" exception to the Watson rule was
nothing more than dictum.202
PART IV. RELIGION CLAUSE DOCTRINE IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL ERA
On the heels of Cantwell and Everson v. Board of Education of
Ewing203 in the 1940s, and their application of the Religion Clauses
196. Ellman, supra note 20, at 1387 n.27 ("Although the Supreme Court has
not decided any other cases involving congregational churches, it has explicitly
relied on the hierarchical nature, rather than congregational nature, of the churches
involved in the cases it has decided.").
197. 280 U.S. 1 (1929).
198. Id. at 14.
199. Id. at 16.
200. Id.
201. 426 U.S. 696 (1976).
202. Id. at 712.
203. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
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against the states by incorporation of the First Amendment into the
Fourteenth Amendment, came Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the
204
Russian Orthodox Church of North America. Kedroff
constitutionalized the common law principles of religious freedom the
205
Court found pervasive in Watson.
A. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church
of North America
Kedroff is remarkable not only for it being the first time an
internal church dispute was submitted to a First Amendment Religion
Clause analysis,206 but also for the time period and context within which
it was decided. In 1952, the year Kedroff was decided, the United States
was in the grips of the Red Scare, a pathological form of anti-
communism fueled by McCarthyism.207 McCarthyism is named after
Wisconsin Senator Joseph McCarthy who served in the United States
Senate from 1947 to 1957.208 During the 1950s, McCarthyism
209
demonized Soviet Russia and its brand of communism. Consequently,
thousands of American citizens were investigated by the Federal Bureau
of Investigation and accused and charged by the House Un-American
Activities Committee of either being a Communist or Communist
sympathizer.210 Being branded a communist or communist sympathizer
211
often led to ruined careers, job loss, and in some cases, imprisonment.
The Supreme Court's decision in Kedroff in the midst of this kind of
social and political climate was extraordinary.
204. 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
205. See id. at 116. See also Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of
the Religion Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church
Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1395 (1981).
206. See Kedroff, 344 U.S. 94; Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 730
("The year 1952 was the first occasion on which this Court examined what limits the
First and Fourteenth Amendments might place upon the ability of the States to
entertain and resolve disputes over church property.").
207. RICHARD M FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED: THE MCCARTHY ERA IN
PERSPECTIVE 131 (1990).
208. Id. at 6, 131.
209. Id. at 131.
210. Id. at 3-4.
211. Id. at 3.
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The case history of Kedroff is lengthy and complex and tells of
the effects of the 1917 Kerensky and Bolsheviki revolutions in Russia on
the Russian Orthodox Church and how that in turn affected the control of
212
the Church's American diocese and cathedral in New York. The
controversy pitted the Supreme Church Authority of the Russian
Orthodox Church in Moscow against the Archdiocese of North America.
At stake was who had the right to use and occupy the Saint Nicholas
Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church in North America located at
15 East 97th Street, New York City. 213 The Russian Orthodox Church in
Moscow claimed that it had the right to occupy the Cathedral on the
214
basis of its superior hierarchical authority. The Russian Orthodox
Church of America, alleging that the Church in Moscow was tainted and
controlled by the communist Russian government, based its claim on
statutes passed by the New York Legislature in 1945 and 1948 declaring
all Russian Orthodox churches in the state to be the property of the
Russian Church in America.215 Deciding in favor of the American
contingent, the Court of Appeals of New York justified the actions of the
New York Legislature with language that was representative of the anti-
communist Russian ideology of that time:
The Legislature of the State of New York, like the
Congress, must be deemed to have investigated the
whole problem carefully before it acted. The
Legislature knew that the central authorities of the
Russian Orthodox Church in Russia had been
suppressed after the 1917 revolution, and that the
patriarchate was later resurrected by the Russian
Government. The Legislature, like Congress, knew
the character and method of operation of
international communism and the Soviet attitude
toward things religious.2 16
212. See Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral of Russ. Orthodox Church, 344
U.S. 94, 95-106 (1952).
213. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of Russ. Orthodox Church in N. Am. v. Kedroff,
96 N.E.2d 56, 56-57 (N.Y. 1950), rev'd, 344 U.S. 94 (1952).
214. Id. at 66-67.
215. Id. at 69.
216. Id. at 73-74.
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On appeal to the United States Supreme Court, the Russian
Orthodox Church in Moscow argued that the New York statute
unconstitutionally interfered with its free exercise of religion.2 17 In the
face of McCarthyism and the prevailing American animus toward
communism and Russia, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of
Appeals of New York. It found the New York statute, which transferred
control of the Russian Orthodox Churches from the governing hierarchy
in Russia to the Russian Church in America, to be in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of religious liberty. 218 The Court
determined that the question as to who has the right to use and occupy
the Cathedral to be one of "ecclesiastical government," and, as such,
219
should be answered by the principles of Watson v. Jones. The Court
explained its position by stating that
[t]he opinion [in Watson] radiates . . . a spirit of
freedom for religious organizations, an
independence from secular control or
manipulation-in short, power to decide for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of
church government as well as those of faith and
doctrine. Freedom to select the clergy, where no
improper methods of choice are proven, we think,
must now be said to have federal constitutional
protection as a part of the free exercise of religion
against state interference.220
Thus, Kedroff raised Watson's common law principle of court
deference to religious organizational hierarchy to that of a constitutional
principle-that the Free Exercise Clause protected religious
organizations from "secular control or manipulation." 2 2 1 This rule of
constitutional law did what Watson's common law rule did not, nor,
could it, do. It made deference of the courts to the decisions of religious
organizations pertaining to ecclesiastical matters, such as internal
217. Kedroff 344 U.S. at 100.
218. Id. at 107.
219. See id. at 115-16.
220. Id. at 116.
221. Id.; see also WITTE, supra note 104, at 249.
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government, faith, and doctrine, the law of the land.22 Still, some states
persisted in holding onto the old English "'implied trust' and 'departure-
from-doctrine' standard," 2 23 where church property was held in trust to
benefit the growth and development of the church and any departure
from traditional church doctrine resulted in a forfeiture of rights to the
property. 2 Georgia was one of those states.
B. Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Memorial Presbyterian Church
In 1966, two local Presbyterian church congregations in Georgia
voted to withdraw from the hierarchically organized and governed
Presbyterian Church in the United States, of which they were a part,
alleging the general church had "abandoned or departed from the tenets
of faith and practice it held at the time the local churches affiliated with
it." 22 5 The Presbyterian Church in the United States, reminiscent of the
hierarchical structure in Watson v. Jones, consists of Church Sessions,
Presbyteries, Synods, and a General Assembly. Local church
congregations are known as Church Sessions. All Church Sessions
within a particular geographical area are part of a Presbytery. The
Presbyteries within a state are part of a Synod. Overall governance is
carried out by the General Assembly.226
Subsequent to the withdrawal of the two local churches, the
Presbyterian Church in the United States, the general church, conducted
an investigation and ultimately acquiesced to the withdrawal and took
227
control of the local church property on behalf of the general church.
The two local churches responded by suing to enjoin the general
church's possession and control of the property.228 The general church
222. HOWE, supra note 64, at 89.
223. Adams & Hanlon, supra note 119, at 1298-99.
224. See Lash, supra note 120, at 1111; see also Kauper, supra note 165, at
349-52.
225. Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'1
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 441 (1969).
226. Id at 442.
227. Id at 442-43.
228. See id. at 443.
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filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the court was without power to
rule on whether it had "departed from its tenets of faith and practice."229
The motion was dismissed, and, ultimately, the case went to trial.23 0 At
trial, consistent with prevailing Georgia law, a jury found that the general
church had abandoned the original tenets and doctrines upon which the
general church was originally founded thereby forfeiting its rights to the
231 232local church property. The Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed.
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on the First
Amendment issues raised by the general church's objection to the trial
court hearing and ruling on whether it had abandoned its tenets of
faith.233
In reversing the Georgia Supreme Court, the Court expressly
rejected Georgia's "' implied trust' and 'departure-from-doctrine"'
234
standard and validated the deference principles embodied in Watson,
of235Gonzalez, and Kedroff Then, in a surprising statement, it said that not
every court decision involving an intra-church property dispute
236implicates deference to the First Amendment. On those occasions,
said the Court, "neutral principles of law" may be relied on to resolve the
237matter. No further explanation for this statement was offered. A fuller
meaning of what the Court meant by this statement would come ten years
later in Jones v. Wolf238 Meanwhile, a year after Presbyterian Church,
the Supreme Court gave a wink and a nod to the use of "neutral
principles" in a Maryland case involving a question of who, as between
two local churches and the regional church, should control the local
239church property. In a per curiam decision, the Court dismissed an
appeal from a decision of the Maryland Court of Appeals affirming the
229. Id.
230. See id.
231. Id. at 443-44.
232. Id. at 444.
233. Id.
234. Adams & Hanlon, supra note 119, at 1298-99.
235. See Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 448-49 (adhering to the principle
that the civil court must abstain from considering ecclesiastical matters).
236. Id. at 449.
237. Id.
238. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
239. See Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at
Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (per curiam).
128 [Vol. 11
2012] SECULARIZATION BY INCORPORATION
trial court's use of neutral principles in examining state statutes, property
deeds, church constitution, and church charter in deciding the intra-
church property dispute.240 In his concurring opinion, Justice William
Brennan made a statement that would find its way into a later Supreme
Court case241 validating the use of the "neutral principles of law"
approach in the resolution of intra-church property disputes: "[A] State
may adopt any one of various approaches for settling church property
disputes so long as it involves no consideration of doctrinal matters ...
,,242
C. Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for U.S. of America and Canada
v. Milivojevich
Those who concluded from Presbyterian Church's outlier
statement on "neutral principles" and the Supreme Court's specious
countenance of that statement in Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of
243
God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc. that the "neutral principles
of law" approach had supplanted the deference principles of Watson,
Gonzalez, and Kedroff raised their eyebrows when the Court handed
down its decision in Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. &
244
Canada v. Milivojevich seven years after Presbyterian Church. In no
uncertain terms, the Court confirmed its earlier holdings in Watson,
Gonzalez, and Kedroff that in matters involving intra-church property
disputes, civil courts must accept the decision of the highest
ecclesiastical tribunal regarding doctrine, discipline, polity and
- 245
practice.
Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese involved the defrockment of
the Bishop of the Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United
States and Canada by the Serbian Orthodox Church in Yugoslavia
("Mother Church") and reorganization of the United States Diocese into
240. Id. at 367-68.
241. See Jones, 443 U.S. at 602.
242. Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S. at 368 (Brennan, J., concurring) (per
curiam) (emphasis omitted).
243. Id at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring) (per curiam).
244. Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696 (1976).
245. Id at 711-14.
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246
three Dioceses. The defrocked Bishop filed suit asking for an
injunction against the Mother Church from interfering with the assets of
the United States Diocese and for a declaration that he was the true
247
Bishop of the United States Diocese. On appeal from the trial court,
the Illinois Supreme Court found that the Mother Church had not
followed its constitution and penal code in disciplining the Bishop and
248
that the reorganization had exceeded its authority. Consequently, the
Illinois Supreme Court, finding the conduct of the Mother Church to be
"arbitrary," held its actions invalid.249 On grant of certiorari, the United
States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice William Brennan,
reversed. The Court held that the inquiries of the Illinois Supreme Court
leading to the conclusion that the Mother Church had failed to follow its
own rules and procedures in defrocking the United States Bishop had
250
violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. According to the
Court, civil courts are prohibited from engaging in an inquiry that
assesses whether the governing body of a hierarchical religious
organization has authority to decide an intra-church dispute.251 The
Court found that such an inquiry requires an impermissible probing into
religious law and polity.252 When it comes to matters involving religious
law and polity, explained the Court, civil courts must abide by the
decisions of the "highest ecclesiastical tribunal within a church of
hierarchical polity." 25 3  The Court went on to say that because the
"arbitrariness" exception mentioned in Gonzalez was only "dictum," its
use by the Illinois Supreme Court to justify "marginal civil court review"
was invalid.254 Echoing Watson, the Court reiterated and emphasized
that civil courts "must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church
tribunals as it finds them."255 Therefore, concluded the Court, an inquiry
into whether or not the Mother Church had strayed from its own laws
246. Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 696.
247. Id at 706-07.
248. Id. at 708.
249. Id at 698.
250. Id at 697-98.
251. Id. at 708.
252. Id at 709.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 712.
255. Id. at 713.
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and procedures in defrocking its Bishop, and reorganizing the United
States Diocese is an ecclesiastical action which civil courts are
incompetent to adjudicate. 25 6
D. Jones v. Wolf and the "Neutral Principles of Law"
Three years after Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese, the
Supreme Court again considered an intra-church property dispute in
Jones v. Wolf257 In a 5-4 decision, the Jones Court specifically
identified the issue as "whether civil courts, consistent with the First and
Fourteenth Amendments," resolve intra-church property disputes by
application of "neutral principles of law." 258 In Jones, the Court dealt
head-on for the first time with the application of "neutral principles of
259
law" in intra-church property disputes. In doing so, it reached back to
its passing mention of the "neutral principles of law" in Presbyterian
Church26 0 and Justice Brennan's brief discussion of "neutral principles"
261
in his concurrence in the per curiam decision, Md. & Va. Eldership.
Like Watson, Jones involved controversy over property growing
out of a schism within a local congregation of the hierarchically
262
organized Presbyterian Church in the United States. In Jones, a
majority of the Vineville Presbyterian Church of Macon, Georgia voted
to separate from the Presbyterian Church in the United States and joined
263
the Presbyterian Church in America. The majority continued to
occupy and worship in the local church property while the minority
, 264
removed themselves to another location for worship. After a three
year investigation, a presbytery appointed commission of the
Presbyterian Church in the United States declared the minority
256. Id. at 713, 720-721.
257. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
258. Id. at 597.
259. Id.
260. Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'1
Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
261. Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of God v. Church of God at
Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (per curiam).
262. Jones, 443 U.S. at 595.
263. Id at 598.
264. Id
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congregants to be "the true congregation."265 The minority faction then
initiated legal proceedings to establish its rights to the local church
266property. The trial court applied Georgia's "neutral principles of law"
and awarded the local church property to the majority.267 On appeal, the
268
Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Upon review, the Court noted the use of "neutral principles of
law" by the Georgia courts was consistent with its reversal of
Presbyterian Church269 where it stated that "there are neutral principles
of law, developed for use in all property disputes, which can be applied
without 'establishing' churches to which property is awarded."270 The
Court then went on to describe how the Georgia Supreme Court, in
response to the reversal and remand of Presbyterian Church,
subsequently applied and refined the "neutral principles of law"
approach by validating the review of property deeds, corporate charters,
state statutes, and religious documents in the resolution of intra-church
271property disputes. In approving Georgia's application of "neutral
principles of law," the Court explained that even though the First
Amendment puts significarit restraints on civil courts becoming involved
in intra-church property disputes, there is nothing in the First
Amendment that requires "compulsory deference to religious authority in
resolving church property disputes."2 72 As a matter of fact, said the
Court, "the First Amendment does not dictate that a State must follow a
particular method of resolving church property disputes."273 On the
contrary, "neutral principles of law" is an alternative means for a court to
265. Id
266. Id
267. Id. at 599.
268. Id. at 598-99.
269. Id. at 599.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 600-01. On remand of Presbyterian Church, the Georgia Supreme
Court reviewed not only real property deeds and state statutes, it also reviewed the
Book of Church Order. Id. at 600. In Carnes v. Smith, 222 S.E.2d 322, cert. denied,
429 U.S. 868 (Ga. 1976), a controversy involving The United Methodist Church, the
Georgia Supreme Court reviewed not only property deeds, corporate charter and
state statutes, it also reviewed the constitution of The United Methodist Church and
its Book of Discipline. Jones, 443 U.S. at 600.
272. Jones, 443 U.S. at 604-05.
273. Id. at 602.
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resolve an intra-church property dispute.274 Finding "neutral principles
of law" to be secular, flexible, objective, and familiar to lawyers and
judges, and obviating the need to rely on internal organizational structure
275
in the resolution of intra-church property disputes, the Court held
"neutral principles of law" to be an acceptable method for adjudicating
church property disputes. 276  "The neutral-principles approach, in
contrast, obviates entirely the need for an analysis or examination of
ecclesiastical polity or doctrine in settling church property disputes.,
2 77
E. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission and the "Ministerial
Exception"
In January 2012, the United States Supreme Court for the first
time acknowledged and affirmed the "ministerial exception," a doctrine
278
created and nurtured in the lower courts over a span of four decades.
First introduced by the Fifth Circuit in 1972,29 the "ministerial
274. Id. at 602-03 (referencing Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of God v.
Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970) (Brennan, J.,
concurring) (per curiam)).
275. Id. at 603 ("The primary advantages of the neutral-principles approach
are that it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to
accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity. The method relies
exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar
to lawyers and judges."). See also id. at 605 ("The neutral-principles approach ...
obviates entirely the need for an analysis or examination of ecclesiastical polity or
doctrine in settling church property disputes.").
276. Id. at 604. See also Md. & Va. Eldership of Churches of God, 396 U.S. at
370 ("Under the 'formal title' doctrine, civil courts can determine ownership by
studying deeds, reverter clauses, and general state corporation laws.").
277. Jones, 443 U.S. at 605. See also Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S. at 370
("Again, however, general principles of property law may not be relied upon if their
application requires civil courts to resolve doctrinal issues.").
278. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S.
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012).
279. McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972). While the
Fifth Circuit was the first to carve out the principle in McClure, it was over a decade
before the term "ministerial exception" was actually used. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132
S. Ct. at 714 (Alito, J., concurring).
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exception" grants immunity to religious organizations from
discrimination claims made by their ministerial employees.280
The 1972 Fifth Circuit case that first introduced the concept of
281
the "ministerial exception" was McClure v. Salvation Army. 2 I
McClure, Mrs. Billie M. McClure, a commissioned officer and
minister282 in the Salvation Army, filed an employment discrimination
claim against the Salvation Army under Section 703(a) of Title VII, 42
283U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a), alleging that she was terminated by the Salvation
Army in retaliation for her complaints that she was paid less and received
284
fewer benefits than her male counterparts. The Salvation Army
responded that because it is a "religious corporation," any attempts to
subject it to the requirements of Title VII would be in violation of the
285
First Amendment. The Fifth Circuit agreed and, after reminiscing on
280. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Above the Law? The Constitutionality of the
Ministerial Exemption from Antidiscrimination Law, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1965,
1966 (2007).
281. McClure, 460 F.2d at 558-59 ("The relationship between an organized
church and its ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by
which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this relationship must
necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern.").
282. Id. at 556 ("On appeal, neither Mrs. McClure nor the EEOC, as amicus
curiae, question the Salvation Army's status as a religion or her status as a minister
engaged in the religious or ecclesiastical activities of the church.").
283. The statute says:
(a) Employer practices
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an
employer--
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with
respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or
applicants for employment in any way which would
deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion,
sex, or national origin.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).
284. McClure, 460 F.2d at 555.
285. Id. at 555-56.
134 [Vol. 11I
2012] SECULARIZATION BY INCORPORATION
'286 eZ287 2erof88the deference principles of Watson, Gonzalez, Kedroff, and
Presbyterian Church,289 concluded that the relationship between the
Salvation Army and Mrs. McClure, that between "minister" and the
religious organization served, was the "lifeblood" of the religious
organization.290 Consequently, opined the court, an application of Title
VII to this "lifeblood" relationship would be a violation of the First
Amendment's Free Exercise Clause.291 During the forty years following
McClure, each of the Circuits considered and recognized a First
Amendment based "ministerial exception. ,292 It was not until 2012,
however, that the United States Supreme Court finally weighed in on the
"ministerial exception" in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
and School v. EEOC.293 In Hosanna-Tabor, the Supreme Court
considered whether or not the "ministerial exception" immunized a
Lutheran church and school from a discrimination claim made by one of
the school's teachers.294 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church
286. See supra Part III.A.
287. See supra Part III.C.
288. See supra Part IV.A.
289. See supra Part IV.B.
290. See McClure, 460 F.2d at 558-59 ("The relationship between an
organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is the chief
instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this
relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern.").
291. McClure, 460 F.2d at 560.
292. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S.
,, 132 S. Ct. 694, 705 (2012). In footnote 2, the Court lists the Courts of
Appeals cases embracing the ministerial exception: Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d
198, 204-09 (2d Cir. 2008); Schleicher v. Salvation Army, 518 F.3d 472, 475 (7th
Cir. 2008); Hollins v. Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223, 225-27 (6th Cir.
2007); Petruska v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 303-307 (3d Cir. 2006); Werft v.
Desert Sw. Annual Conference, 377 F.3d 1099, 1100-04 (9th Cir. 2004); Bryce v.
Episcopal Church, 289 F.3d 648, 655-57 (10th Cir. 2002); EEOC v. Roman Catholic
Diocese, 213 F.3d 795, 800-01 (4th Cir. 2000); Gellington v. Christian Methodist
Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299, 1301-04 (11th Cir. 2000); Combs v. Central
Tex. Annual Conference, 173 F.3d 343, 345-50 (5th Cir. 1999); EEOC v. Catholic
Univ., 83 F.3d 455, 460-63 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Scharon v. St. Luke's Episcopal
Presbyterian Hospitals, 929 F.2d 360, 362-63 (8th Cir. 1991); Natal v. Christian &
Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575, 1578 (1st Cir. 1989).
293. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694.
294. Id.
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and School is a hierarchical religious corporation295 whose congregation
296
is subordinate to the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod. The school,
which provides education from kindergarten through eighth grade, is
staffed with teachers referred to by the Synod as either "called" or
"lay."297 "Called" teachers are those who, after successfully completing
a church required regimen of theological training and examination, are
eligible to be "called" by their congregation to teach.29 8 If "called," the
teacher receives the title "Minister of Religion, Commissioned," and may
only be terminated by a supermajority vote of the congregation.299 "Lay"
teachers, on the other hand, are not required to complete theological
training and are hired by the school board only if there are no "called"
teachers available to fill a position.300 The events giving rise to the
Supreme Court granting certiorari to consider Hosanna-Tabor's appeal
were precipitated by events regarding Cheryl Perich, one of Hosanna-
Tabor's "called" teachers.3 0'
At the beginning of the 2004-2005 school year, Cheryl Perich
went on disability leave resulting from a sleep disorder.302 At midterm,
January 2005, she announced that she was significantly cured of her
disability and capable of returning to gainful employment.303 The school
refused to allow her return to work and justified its refusal on the fact
that her position had been filled with a "lay" teacher for the remainder of
the school year and on its disagreement with her health assessment. 30 4
Perich's continued insistence that she be allowed to return to work and a
stated intent to take legal action against the school resulted in the school
295. Id.; see also BASSETT ET AL., supra note 3.




300. Id. at 700.
301. Id.
302. Id. (noting that in June 2004, Perich was diagnosed with narcolepsy,
whose symptoms cause "sudden and deep sleeps from which she could not be
roused").
303. Id.
304. Id. ("The congregation voted to offer Perich a 'peaceful release' from her
call, whereby the congregation would pay a portion of her health insurance
premiums in exchange for her resignation as a called teacher.").
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board and congregation voting to terminate her employment.305 Perich
responded by filing a claim with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission alleging that she had been terminated in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act.306 The Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission subsequently filed a retaliatory discharge suit against
Hosanna-Tabor for allegedly terminating Perich for her threat to file an
Americans with Disabilities Act claim. 30 7 Hosanna-Tabor responded that
because the relationship between it and Perich was one between a
religious organization and one of its ministers, the "ministerial
exception" immunized the school from the lawsuit's claims.30 The U.S.
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan agreed with Hosanna-
309
Tabor. On appeal, the Sixth Circuit agreed with the EEOC and the
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.310
In an opinion written by Chief Justice John Roberts, the Court
recognized a "ministerial exception" 31' for the first time and held that the
exception operates to immunize a religious organization from its
ministers' employment discrimination claims.312 The Court's
conclusions were premised on its understanding that both the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clause prohibited governmental interference
in a religious organization's choice of its minister.m These decisions,
said the Court, are "entirely ecclesiastical" matters for a religious
organization to make on its own.3 14 The Court then went on to draw
305. Id.
306. Id. at 701.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id. (noting that the district court granted summary judgment for Hosanna-
Tabor).
310. Id. at 701-02.
311. Id. at 706.
312. Id. at 706. The Court expressly limited its holding to employment
discrimination suits. Id. at 710. "Today we hold only that the ministerial exception
bars [employment discrimination suits]. We express no view on whether the
exception bars other types of suits ..... Id.
313. Id. at 706.
314. See id at 703 ("[W]hen John Carroll, the first Catholic bishop in the
United States, solicited the Executive's opinion on who should be appointed to direct
the affairs of the Catholic Church in the territory newly acquired by the Louisiana
Purchase . .. then-Secretary of State [James] Madison responded that the selection of
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from the rationales of Kedrofi15  and Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Diocese316 and determined that a "ministerial exception," which protects
religious organizations from employment discrimination claims by their
ministers, is embodied in the First Amendment's Religion Clauses.m
From there, the Court proceeded to find that, contrary to the conclusions
of the Sixth Circuit, the facts clearly supported a finding that Perich was
a minister whose claim was subject to the "ministerial exception." 3 18
Hosanna-Tabor continued the Court's persistent reliance on
hierarchical religious organizations to shape First Amendment Religion
Clause doctrine.319
F. Hierarchical Dominion
The Supreme Court has, within the context of internal property
disputes,32 0 shaped contradictory First Amendment Religion Clause
doctrine. It has simultaneously mandated that civil courts defer to
ecclesiastical tribunals (in the case of hierarchical religious
church 'functionaries' was an 'entirely ecclesiastical' matter left to the Church's
own judgment.").
315. See id. at 705 (noting that a "Church's choice of its hierarchy[ ]" is an
ecclesiastical right protected by the Free Exercise Clause (citing Kedroff v. Saint
Nicholas Cathedral of Russian Orthodox Church in North America, 344 U.S. 94, 119
(1952))).
316. See id. at 705 (citing Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724 (1976)) (stating that the rules and regulations of
hierarchical religious organizations disciplining and governing their choice of
ministers is protected by the First Amendment against government intrusion).
317. See id.
318. See id. at 708 ("In light of... the formal title given Perich by the Church,
the substance reflected in that title, her own use of that title, and the important
religious functions she performed for the Church . . . we conclude that Perich was a
minister whose claim was covered by the ministerial exception.").
319. See supra Part 111.
320. See Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 704-05; see also Serb. E. Orthodox
Diocese, 426 U.S. 696; Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595 (1979); Md. & Va. Eldership of
the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (per curiam); Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary
Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'1 Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969); Kedroff
344 U.S. 94; Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 14
(1929); Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
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organizations)32 and a majority of members (in the case of
322
congregationally structured and organized religious organizations) on
ecclesiastical matters (i.e. faith, doctrine, governance, 323 and practice 32 4 ),
while allowing civil courts to optionally ignore the decisions of these
ecclesiastical bodies and apply "neutral principles of law. ,32 Neutral
principles of law" allow civil courts to paint all religious organizations
with the same brush.326 My argument is that an application of "neutral
principles" overlooks the ecclesiastical characteristics of a religious
organization and highlights its secular characteristics. The focus on the
secular aspects works as a disadvantage to congregational organizations
because their internal organizational structure is more secular than
hierarchical organizations. This causes their religiosity to be dwarfed by
their corporate nature. At this point, they are considered more like
corporations than religious organizations, and their corporate-ness
overwhelms the court.
321. Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. at 724-25 ("[T]he First and Fourteenth
Amendments permit hierarchical religious organizations to establish their own rules
and regulations for internal discipline and government, and to create tribunals for
adjudicating disputes over these matters. When this choice is exercised and
ecclesiastical tribunals are created to decide disputes over the government and
direction of subordinate bodies, the Constitution requires that civil courts accept
their decisions as binding upon them.").
322. Md. & Va. Eldership, 396 U.S. at 368 (Brennan, J., concurring) (quoting
Watson, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 724)).
323. Kedroff 344 U.S. at 116. See also Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at
713 ("[C]ivil courts are bound to accept the decisions of the highest judicatories of a
religious organization of hierarchical polity on matters of discipline, faith, internal
organization, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law.") (emphasis added)).
324. Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 710.
325. Jones, 443 U.S. at 602-03.
326. Id. The Court has applied the "neutral principles of law" doctrine to
resolve lawsuits arising in a variety of religious organizations, regardless of
denomination or structural organization. See, e.g., Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese, 426
U.S. at 723 n.15; Md. & Va. Churches, 396 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring);
Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
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PART V.VULNERABILITY OF CONGREGATIONAL RELIGIOUS
CORPORATIONS
A. Congregationally Organized Religious Organizations Are Seen As
More Corporate Than Religious
The ubiquity of the corporation in commerce and everyday life
has made it familiar to both the bench and the bar. It is rare, indeed, to
find an attorney who is not familiar with the apparatus of a corporation,
i.e., articles of incorporation, bylaws, minutes, and resolutions.
Likewise, it is not surprising for a civil court to find a corporation on its
docket. As Justice Harry Blackmun suggested in Jones v. Wolf the
rudiments of corporate law represent "objective, well-established
,,127
concepts of . . . law familiar to lawyers and judges. Familiarity,
though, often breeds contempt.328 When familiarity, born of the
confidence with which the courts so expertly and routinely consider
corporate controversies, is applied to a religious corporation without
fully recognizing or appreciating the organization's religious essence, it
amounts to an act of hubris. A hubris that not only presumes to know
what is best, but, because of the corporate infrastructure of the religious
organization, assumes it has all the requisite tools to resolve the matter.
Consequently, ecclesiastical issues are often treated as corporate matters
and First Amendment free exercise guarantees are shoved aside as
insignificant.
This is the predicament of the many state-chartered,
incorporated, congregational religious organizations. Created pursuant
to state incorporation statutes and following the statute's operational
requirements, congregational religious organizations necessarily adopt
the processes of a corporation, and in some ways even begin to act like
327. Jones, 443 U.S. at 603 ("The primary advantages of the neutral-principles
approach are that it is completely secular in operation, and yet flexible enough to
accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity. The method relies
exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of trust and property law familiar
to lawyers and judges.").
328. Compare AESOP, THE Fox WHO HAD NEVER SEEN A LION, reprinted in
THE MEDICI AESOP 27 (Bernard McTigue trans., Spencer Collection of the New
York Public Library 1989).
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secular corporations by adopting bylaws for the governance of their
affairs329 and passing resolutions to authorize corporate acts, which are
documented with corporate minutes. Many bind their clergy by
contract.3 30  The blend of corporate processes and procedures with
religious practice has a tendency to turn religious tradition and doctrine
into mere circumstance.33 1 When this happens, intra-organizational
disputes of the type that are routinely handled by internal tribunals in
hierarchical polities are, in the congregational polity, handled by a civil
court judge. In these situations, when a court decides to take the road
most familiar and follow its corporate instincts, religious freedoms are
332often put in peril; the rules are followed, but injustice is done.
Situations involving employment disputes between a religious
organization and its clergy offer typical illustrations.
The employment relationship between an organization and its
clergy is paradigmatically an ecclesiastical one entitled to First
329. See Viravonga v. Wat Buddha Samakitham, 279 S.W.3d 44 (Ark. 2008)
(involving plaintiff members of a Buddhist temple organized as Arkansas nonprofit
corporation who brought action against defendant members, alleging that the
temple's abbot had violated corporate bylaws by dismissing the board of directors
and by attempting to appoint a new board of directors).
330. See, e.g., Bruss v. Przybylo, 895 N.E.2d 1102 (111. App. Ct. 2008)
(regarding former members of church and of church's board of directors who
brought action against church pastor and current members of church's board for
declaratory and other relief, claiming that pastor did not fulfill terms of his
employment agreement).
331. See JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (1689), reprinted
in JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION AND OTHER WRITINGS 36-37
(Mark Goldie, David Womersly eds., 2010) (noting that Jewish Sabbath on
Saturdays is part of worship itself, while for Christians, the time and location of
worship is a circumstance and is not integral to worship).
332. JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., PERSONS & MASKS OF THE LAW 6 (1976) ("It is no
accident that in those trials which have been celebrated in literature and in the
history of our consciousness-the trial of Socrates, the trial of Thomas More, the
trial of Jesus-the rules were followed and yet the human judgment has always been
that injustice was done, the person condemned to death was not given his due, the
paradigm of justice was violated.").
333. In McClure v. Salvation Army, 460 F.2d 553 (5th Cir. 1972), the court
expressly acknowledged that "[t]he relationship between an organized church and its
ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is the chief instrument by which the church
seeks to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching this relationship must necessarily be
recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern." Id. at 558-59. Yet, in Vann v.
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Amendment protection.334 A long line of Supreme Court cases illustrates
this point. In Gonzalez, the Supreme Court said that the appointment of
clergy is a canonical act that must be accepted by "secular courts as
conclusive." 335 In Kedroff, the Court declared that interference by the
state with a religious organization's appointment of its clergy "prohibits
the free exercise of religion."336 In Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese,
the Court reversed the Illinois Supreme Court on First Amendment
grounds when it interfered with a religious organization's defrockment of
its clergy. 337 Most recently, in Hosanna-Tabor, the Court validated the
forty-year-old lower court created "ministerial exception" that recognizes
the First Amendment implications of the special relationship between a
religious organization and its minister.338 These are the cases that have
Guildfield Missionary Baptist Church, 452 F. Supp. 2d 651, 652 (W.D. Va. 2006), a
minister sued a Virginia congregational church for breach of contract after it ceased
paying his salary, based on the deacon chairman's attempt to unilaterally terminate
his employment without notice or majority vote at called business meeting.
334. Kedroff v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral of the Russian Orthodox Church of
N. Am., 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) ("Freedom to select the clergy ... we think, must
now be said to have federal constitutional protection as a part of the free exercise of
religion against state interference."). See also Gonzalez v. Roman Catholic
Archbishop of Manila, 280 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1929) ("Because the appointment [of a
chaplain] is a canonical act, it is the function of the church authorities to determine
what the essential qualifications of a chaplain are and whether the candidate
possesses them.").
335. Gonzalez, 280 U.S. at 16.
336. Kedroff, 344 U.S. at 108.
337. Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese for U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696
(1976).
338. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S.
132 S. Ct. 694 (2012); McClure, 460 F.2d at 558-59 ("The relationship
between an organized church and its ministers is its lifeblood. The minister is the
chief instrument by which the church seeks to fulfill its purpose. Matters touching
this relationship must necessarily be recognized as of prime ecclesiastical concern.").
See also, e.g., Rweyemamu v. Cote, 520 F.3d 198 (2d Cir. 2008); Hollins v.
Methodist Healthcare, Inc., 474 F.3d 223 (6th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 857
(2007), abrogated by Hosanna-Tabor, 132 S. Ct. 694; Petruska v. Gannon Univ.,
462 F.3d 294 (3d Cir. 2006); Elvig v. Calvin Presbyterian Church, 375 F.3d 951 (9th
Cir. 2004); Alicea-Hernandez v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 320 F.3d 698, 704 (7th
Cir. 2003); Bryce v. Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Colo., 289 F.3d 648 (10th
Cir. 2002); Gellington v. Christian Methodist Episcopal Church, Inc., 203 F.3d 1299
(11th Cir. 2000); EEOC v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 213 F.3d 795 (4th Cir. 2000);
142 [Vol. 11I
20121 SECULARIZATION BY INCORPORATION
shaped the development of First Amendment religious doctrine
applicable to the resolution of internal disputes in religious organizations.
Conspicuously absent from this jurisprudence are any cases involving a
religious organization of congregational polity. As a matter of fact, the
Supreme Court has decided only one case involving an internal dispute
within a religious organization of congregational polity,339 and that case
made no mention of or reference to Watson, which had been decided just
.340one year prior.
Yet, civil courts frequently fail to recognize or acknowledge the
ecclesiastical nature of the relationship between a religious organization
of congregational polity and its clergy in the same way they do for those
of hierarchical polity. 34 1 For example, civil courts easily presume that
the duties of a Roman Catholic priest are determined by Catholic
doctrine, with the corollary being that any consideration by the court of
these duties will lead to a prohibited entanglement in religious
342
doctrine. On the other hand, with organizations of congregational
polity, the duties of its clergy are often considered to be corporate or
contractual obligations capable of interpretation by application of neutral
principles through review of the organization's contracts, bylaws,
constitution, minutes, and resolutions. 34 3 For instance, where the duties
Scharon v. Saint Luke's Episcopal Presbyterian Hosp., 929 F.2d 360 (8th Cir. 1991);
Natal v. Christian & Missionary Alliance, 878 F.2d 1575 (1st Cir. 1989).
339. Bouldin v. Alexander, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 131 (1872). But see Little v.
First Baptist Church, 475 U.S. 1148 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (rejecting the
Court's refusal to grant certiorari) (involving trial court that enjoined a pastor from
church property and church affairs after he challenged the church's authority to
terminate him).
340. See Ellman, supra note 20, at 1387.
341. Compare Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d 198 (concerning the demonstration of a
court's treatment of a religious organization of hierarchical polity), with Vann v.
Guildfield Missionary Baptist Church, 452 F. Supp. 2d 651 (W.D. Va. 2006)
(involving a court's treatment of a religious dispute within an organization of
congregational polity).
342. See, e.g., Rweyemamu, 520 F.3d 198; aee also Natal, 878 F.2d 1575
(affirming the district court's dismissal of priest's wrongful termination claim due to
the First Amendment requirement that courts not interfere with church policy).
343. Vann, 452 F. Supp. 2d 651 (sustaining a pastor's claim that the Chairman
of the Deacon Board unilaterally terminated him without following the
organization's bylaws sustained). See, e.g., First Baptist Church of Glen Este v. State
of Ohio, 591 F. Supp. 676 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Ex Parte Bd. of Trustees of Old Elam
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of a Protestant pastor are not presumed to be so much a matter of
religious doctrine, but more those of a president of a voluntary
association or nonprofit corporation, a court will tend to treat the matter
as another secular corporate dispute. 34 4
This often leads to an application of neutral principles to
controversies that are beyond the scope of the "neutral principles of law"
doctrine. The Supreme Court cases out of which this doctrine arose
repeatedly refer to "property" as the subject-matter at the core of the
controversy.345 Nothing in these exclusively hierarchical polity cases
allows for the application of the "neutral principles of law" doctrine to
any controversy other than those involving intra-church property
disputes. As recently as Hosanna-Tabor the Court acknowledged that
controversies over property have had an indirect influence on First
346
Amendment religious doctrine. Still, civil courts repeatedly apply
"neutral principles" when considering non-property related disputes in
Baptist Church v. Bd. of Trustees of Old Elam Baptist Church, 983 So. 2d 1079
(Ala. 2007); Viravonga v. Wat Buddha Samakitham, 279 S.W.3d 44 (Ark. 2008);
Meshel v. Ohev Sholom Talmud Torah, 869 A.2d 343 (D.C. 2005); Waverly Hall
Baptist Church, Inc. v. Branham, 625 S.E.2d 23 (Ga. Ct. App. 2005); Jenkins v.
Trinity Evangelical Lutheran Church, 825 N.E.2d 1206 (1ll. App. Ct. 2005); Second
Int'l. Baha'i Council v. Chase, 106 P.3d 1168 (Mont. 2005); Guinn v. Church of
Christ of Collinsville, 775 P.2d 766 (Okla. 1989); Lacy v. Bassett, 132 S.W.3d 119
(Tex. Ct. App. 2004); Bowie v. Murphy, 624 S.E.2d 74 (Va. 2006).
344. See, e.g., First Baptist Church of Glen Este, 591 F. Supp. at 681
("[C]ourts may properly review whether a congregational church followed its own
constitution and by-laws, and afforded fundamental due process in disciplinary
proceedings by employing 'neutral principles of law' .... .").
345. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 595 (1979) (providing for the
application of "neutral principles of law" in resolving an internal dispute over local
control of a church's property.); Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v.
Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367 (1970) (per curiam) (regarding a
dispute as to which, of two church factions, controlled church property);
Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem'l Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. 440, 441 (1969) (involving a church property dispute between two
local churches and the hierarchical general church).
346. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S.
,, 132 S. Ct. 694, 704 (2012) ("This Court touched upon the issue [of church
autonomy in selecting ministers] indirectly, however, in the context of disputes over
church property.").
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congregational religious corporations.3 47 Inquiries of the type criticized
by the United States Supreme Court in Serbian East Orthodox Diocese
are instructive.
Recall that in Serbian East Orthodox Diocese, the Court found
the Illinois Supreme Court's inquiry into, and, subsequent interpretation
of the church's constitution and penal code to have been an
impermissible inquiry into the church's polity. 34 8 In doing so, it warned
civil courts to avoid being drawn into disputes that on the surface may
appear to be about property, but are actually religious controversies that
only affect property. 349 Adjudication of property disputes that involve
ecclesiastical issues, the Court said, threaten First Amendment
principles. 350
Even so, in congregational polities, we consistently see civil
courts getting involved in prohibited issues having to do with
governance, doctrine, and polity. One reason for this tendency is the
state mandated corporate structure and its accompanying corporate
indicia of bylaws and principles of majority rule inherent to
congregational polities that frequently obscure religious doctrine.
Consequently, the decision of a Baptist deacon board chairman to
terminate a pastor, an act that is often, within the context of African-
American religious custom, doctrinally appropriate, is invalidated by the
347. See Viravonga, 279 S.W.3d 44 (applying neutral principles applied by
court to determine that congregational Buddhist temple should hold an election, and
to justify court supervision of the election); Meshel, 869 A.2d 343 (applying neutral
principles used to whether Beth Din bylaw provision was enforceable); Waverly Hall
Baptist Church, 625 S.E.2d 23 (applying neutral principles to justify ordering a
congregational church to hold church meeting to determine whether incumbent
pastor would remain); Rosen v. Lebewohl, 28 Misc. 3d 1226(A) (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2010) (unpublished disposition) (applying neutral principles used to determine
whether congregational Jewish Synagogue Center followed bylaws in conduct of
election of officers); Johnson v. Antioch United Holy Church, Inc., 714 S.E.2d 806
(N.C. Ct. App. 2011) (applying neutral principles to determine whether church
complied with state's Nonprofit Corporation Act, regarding i.e., regularly elected a
board of directors, followed bylaws); Bowie, 624 S.E.2d 74 (applying neutral
principles applied to church deacon's claims that he was defamed during vote to
remove pastor).
348. Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese for the U.S. & Can. v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S.
696, 708 (1975).
349. Id. at 709.
350. Id. at 709-10 (citing Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449).
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court as contravening majority rule principles.3 51  A provision in the
corporate bylaws of an Orthodox Jewish congregation that allows
unresolved claims of members against the congregation to be decided by
a "Beth Din" of Orthodox Jewish rabbis is determined by the court to be
subject to a neutral-principles of contract law analysis;352 or, a
determination of whether individuals of a Hindu Temple had standing to
challenge the Temple's spiritual leader and board of trustees could be
determined by application of "neutral principles of law." 35 3 The rationale
for these otherwise impermissible inquiries and considerations is a
failure to recognize the difference between a controversy over religious
matters regarding "matters of discipline, faith, internal organization, or
ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law" 3 54 that affects property, and a
controversy about property that affects only property. It leaves a
congregational organization vulnerable to a determination of whether or
not it has followed mandated corporate rules.
CONCLUSION
Religious organizations are not above the law. The state has a
legitimate interest in, and religious corporations are entitled to, the
protection of their property rights.356 The problem is the confusion
brought on by the corporate face of today's religious institutions
(churches, synagogues, mosques, and temples) who are obliged to
351. See Vann v. Guildfield Missionary Baptist Church, 452 F. Supp. 2d 651
(W.D. Va. 2006); see also supra note 20.
352. Meshel, 869 A.2d at 346.
353. Temple-Ashram v. Satyanandji, 84 A.D.3d 1158 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011).
354. Serb. E. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 713.
355. "[N]ot every civil court decision . . . jeopardizes values protected by the
First Amendment." Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449.
356. "The State has an obvious and legitimate interest in the peaceful
resolution of property disputes, and in providing a civil forum where the ownership
of church property can be determined conclusively [without engaging in religious
doctrine.]" Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1978) (quoting Md. & Va. Eldership
of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg, Inc., 396 U.S. 367, 368
(1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (per curiam)); see also Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13
Wall.) 679, 714 (1871) ("Religious organizations come before us in the same attitude
as other voluntary associations for benevolent or charitable purposes, and their rights
of property, or of contract, are equally under the protection of the law, and the
actions of their members subject to its restraints.").
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organize as not-for-profit corporations if they want to enjoy certain
.357
privileges such as real estate and 501(c)(3) tax exemptions. However,
once a non-hierarchical religious organization incorporates pursuant to a
state's statute, the organizational structure (e.g., president, vice-
president, secretary, and treasurer) and all the corporate indicia (e.g.,
charters, constitutions, and bylaws) with which it is fitted by statute,
cloaks its real identity and positions it on the state's side of the "wall"
that metaphorically separates the state from religion. On the outside
looking in, the religious corporation is now subject to all the state's laws,
statutes, rules, and regulations that apply to not-for-profit corporations.358
In this space that Roger Williams referred to as the "wilderness," 3 59 it is
an easy thing for a civil court to treat a religious organization as a secular
corporate entity. From a civil court's standpoint, if the organization
before it is organized, structured, and functions like a corporation, the
tendency is to treat it like a corporation. Equipped with a well developed
set of tools and skills with which to deal with corporations and
provisioned with a Supreme Court sanctioned doctrinal option to engage
the matter by consulting the organization's secular, corporate documents,
the temptation is often too much for a court to bear, and it soon finds
itself, in the words of an eighteenth century aphorism, rushing in "where
Angels fear to tread."3 6 0
The entry of the state into the affairs of a religious corporation is
contrary to the religious sensibilities that have been fostered by the
message of the various religious traditions, and jeopardizes the
prominent and privileged place that religion has occupied in this nation's
ethos as carved out in the U.S. Constitution's First Amendment. Thus,
when theology and liberty of conscience is partitioned by a state's
incorporation statute requiring a specific organizational structure, an
application of First Amendment Religious Clause jurisprudence can
often result in inconsistency and uncertainty on the part of civil courts
357. See BASSETT ET AL. supra note 3, at § 4:46.
358. Id. § 3:44.
359. HOWE, supra note 64, at 5-6 (commenting on Roger Williams'
introduction of a metaphor referring to the "gap in the hedge or wall of separation
between the garden of the church and the wilderness of the world" in Williams'
piece entitled "Mr. Cotton's Letter Lately Printed, Examined and Answered").
360. ALEXANDER POPE, AN ESSAY ON CRITICISM WRITTEN IN THE YEAR 1709
29(1717).
147
148 FIRST AMENDMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 11
that in turn leads to an intrusion and entanglement in prohibited religious
affairs. A more constitutionally sound First Amendment Religion Clause
doctrinal analysis should focus on whether or not the essence of the
controversy is ecclesiastical, not on corporate form.
